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Chapter 10

FRUSTRATION
1. Introduction
As noted elsewhere in this book, "sanctity of contract" has been identified
as one of the cornerstones of the classical model of contracts. However, as the
previous chapter on mistake indicated, in certain limited situations parties may
be excused from their contractual obligations. Frustration provides another example
of an excuse from performance obligations. Wh�reas mistake deals with inaccurate
assumptions or lack of knowledge about past or existing circumstances, frustration
relates to inaccurate assumptions about future circumstances. Sometimes it is not
· clear whether a mistake or a frustration analysis is appropriate.
For example, assume that a popular rock band has been scheduled to play
in the only outdoor stadium in your hometown. 1\vo days before the concert,
the local municipality revokes the licence because it is discovered that the stadium
has become very dangerous due to serious architectural flaws. No other venue
is available. All the parties involved in the concert - the band, the promoters,
the airlines, the trucking companies, the roadies, security companies, franchises
and the fans -. had assumed that the stadium would be available. Large sums
of money have been expended in anticipation and significant profits expected.
What is to be done? If the situation (the revocation of the licence) is seen as
linked to danger arising after the contract, then the doctrine of frustration would
be applicable. If, on the other hand, the revocation is seen as linked to a problem
of architectural flaws pre-existing the contract, then the doctrine of mistake could
be applicable.
Under the regime of "sanctity of contract" all the parties would be locked in: they would have to perform their respective obligations or pay damages for
breach. Contractual liability is absolute. But, as we shall see in this chapter► in
the cc;>urse of the last century the courts have been gradually widening the ambit
of the doctrine of frustration, thereby allowing the parties to walk away from
their future obligations because of a supervening contingency. Thus the focus
of Part 2 of this chapter, Development and Application of the Doctrine, is to
identify some of the limited circumstances in which a claim of frustration might
possibly succeed. Such circumstances might include: death, incapacity or unavailabi
lity of a contracting party; destruction or unavailability of the subject matter;
illegality; method of performance becoming impossible; and thwarting of a common
venture. As will become apparent, certain types of arrangements, such as shipping,
661
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building and export sales contracts, are particularly vulnerable to unforeseen
upheavals.
Part 3 addresses the issue of self-induced frustration, and Part 4 deals with
contracts conveying an interest in land. Part 5 raises the question of whether
the doctrine should be expanded further while Part 6 deals with the judicial response
to efforts by the drafters of contracts to plan for the unforeseen via force majeure
clauses. Finally, Part 7 discusses the effects of frustration.
Frustration also provides a particularly good illustration of the debate on
the role of the judiciary in developing contract law. Over the years, a variety
of theories have been espoused by judges and academics as to the underlying
rationale and justifications for the doctrine. In relation to the question of whether
a contract has been frustrated they are usually catalogued as the "implied term",
"construction", and "foundation of the contract" theories. With respec( to the effect
of a frustrated contract, they are commonly described as the ''failure of consider
ation" or 'just solution" approaches. One way to conceptualize the debate is between
those who espouse judicial restraint and those who favour judicial activism.
Those who favour restraint proclaim tfiat "no court has an absolving power"
(Tamplin (F.A.) S.S. Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Co. Ltd., (1916) 2 A.C.
397 at 404 (H.L.). They explain the rare cases of frustration on the basis that
there is an implied term which allows the parties to avoid their contractual obliga
tions.
On the other hand, those who perceive themselves as more realistic claim
it is better if we acknowledge that in these situations the coll!ls are actually making
aspects of the contract for the parties. An example is Lord Radcliffe's unusually
frank (for a judge) acknowledgment that the "reasonable man" is· simply the court's
"anthropomorphic conception of justice" (Davis Contractors v. Fareham U.D. C.,
(1956) A.C. 696 at 728(H.L.)). The most explicit version of this view is to be
found in Lord Wright's assertion that "[t]he truth is . . . the Court . .. decides
the question in accordance with what seems to be just and reasonable in its eyes.
The judge finds in himself the criterion of what is reasonable. The Court is in
this ·sense making a contract for the parties - though it is almost blasphemy
to say so". (Legal Essays and Addresses (1939), at 259).
Those who advocate an interventionist analysis often appeal to "fairness"
or "efficient allocation of risk" as the benchmark for an appropriate resolution
of the case. The following four quotes are attempts by academics to identify
guiding principles that-can help resolve problems of frustration. Collins promotes
fairness, while Atiyah and Posner discuss allocation of risk to the superior risk
bearer and least cost avoider. Trebilcock questions the wisdom of any of these
approaches. In reading the cases that follow the extracts, you might consider (a)
whether the courts are adopting a literalist or an interventionist approach and
(b) whether any of the extracts can provide guidance in explaining the current ·
state of the law.
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COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT
3rd ed. (1997), pp. 279-280

Although the courts prefer to describe their practices as either construction
of the contract in order to fulfil the intentions of the parties or as an independent
rules of law named .. . frustration . . . , neither of these accounts appears strongly
persuasive. If the (judicial] intervention is described as merely construction of
the contract, then, given that the parties did not foresee and have any clear intentions
towards the events which have occurred, we must suspect that the courts use
a further criterion for detennining the intent of the parties. The best interpretation
of this standard is one which takes fairness in the sense of the preservation of
the balance of advantage of the contract as the unacknowledged but vital guide
to interpretation. Altema.tively, if the intervention is described as the application
of the rules of . . . subsequent impossibility, then again the decision whether an
unexpected event renders an obligation impossible must depend upon a judgment
as to whether to continue to insist upon performance would upset the balance
of advantage contained in the contract. ...
Although many judges deny that fairness is relevant to the question of whether
or not a contract is frustrated . .. in increasing numbers they have been admitting
.that a notion of fairness underlies their decisions. The courts usually avoid the
terminology of fairness, however, preferring the concept of justice and injustice
to express the scope of the doctrine....
The process of judicial revision is not so simple as to compare the obligation
of one party before and after the unexpected event in order to discover whether
the event has substantially increased the cost of performance of his obligation.
The criterion of fairness must also be sensitive both to the sophistication of the
parties when they established their contract and the precise allocation of risks
by the contract. Where the parties enjoyed comparable resources for devising a
complex commercial transaction and exercised those resources in order to create
a contract which attempted to allocate all the risks between the parties, then it
is unlikely except in calamitous circumstances that the courts will be prepared
to accept that unexpected events have created any imbalance in the obligations.
H, on the other hand, either one or both parties lack these skills, then the contract
is less likely to be regarded as a presumptively fair allocation of the burdens
of unforeseen and unprovided for eventualities. In these cases, the courts will
countenance judicial revision in order to restore the expectations of the parties
with respect to the balance of advantage contained in the contract.
[Footnotes omitted.]

ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT
5th ed.(1995), pp. 240-243

But if the contract does not expressly allocate the risks, the question is how
the law (or the court, speaking foi; the law) should allocate them. H it is not
reasonable to place the risk of the relevant events on either party the contract

/
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is frustrated whereas, if the risk is placed on either party, that party will be bound
to perform or to pay damages if he cannot do so. The following factors may
be considered as very general guides in deciding whether the court will place
a certain risk on one or other of the parties.
First .. . it can be said that a party takes the risk of any changes in circumstances
which affect only his own purposes in contracting, and do not affect the common
object of both parties. Similarly, a change in circumstances which only affects
the way in which one of the parties is to carry out his obligations does not normally
frustrate a contract. ...
Secondly, it may happen that a party enters into a contract whereby he receives
remuneration so abnormally large that it is clear that in effect he is receiving
a sort of insurance premium against special risks. Then it must be reasonable
to place on him those risks. . . .
The third rule is perhaps the most important of all: generally speaking, a
person who undertakes to do something takes the risk that perfonnance of his
undertaking may prove more onerous than expected, or even impossible, as a
result of changes in circumstances which are normal, or merely slight deviations
from the normal, whereas he does not take the risk of performance proving impos
sible owing to utterly abnormal or extraordinary occurrences. . . .
Fourthly, even though a person does not normally take the risk of non-perfor
mance where performance is rendered impossible as a result of utterly abnormal
developments, he does take the risk, or at all events the courts think it reasonable
to place on him the risk, of non-performance, if the result of the impossibility
is to give him a remedy over against some other person. ...
Finally, it may be laid down as a very rough general rule that, if parties
make a contra<;t which is only to be performed at some distant future date, one
or other of them will be held to have assumed the risk of performance whatever
the future may bring. The point is that a whole object of such contracts is frequently
to eliminate the dangers of later events.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
5th ed. (1999), pp. 115-119

Suppose I agree to supply someone with 1,000 widgets by July l; my factory
burns to the ground; and I cannQt procure widgets from anyone else in time to
fulfill the contract. Suppose, further, that there was no way in which I could
have anticipated or prevented the fire, so that fulfillment of.the contract was genui
nely impossible. It does not follow that I should escape liability for the buyer's
losses that resulted from my failure to perform. My undertaking may have implicitly
included a promise to insure him in the event of my inability to deliver the promised
goods on time. And if such a contract of insurance was implicit in the transaction,
it should be enforced.
The distinction between prevention and insurance as methods of minimizing
loss is fundamental to the analysis of contract law. A loss that can be averted
by an expenditure smaller than the expected loss is preventable, but not all losses
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are preventable in this sense; the fire that destroyed the factory in the preceding
example was assumed not to be. Through insurance, however, it may be possible
to reduce the costs created by the risk of loss. The insured exchanges the possibility
of a loss for a smaller, but certain, cost (the insurance premium). ...
[l]f an event rendering the contract uneconomical (such as unexpectedly severe
weather) is not preventable at a cost less than the expected loss caused by nonperfor
mance, one of the contracting parties may be the cheaper insurer. 1bis is a reason
independent of ability to prevent the event from occurring for assuming that the
parties, had they made provision for this contingency, would have assigned that
party the risk. If the promisee is the intended risk bearer, the promisor is discharged
if the risk materializes and prevents him from completing performance.
To determine the cheaper insurer, it is convenient to divide the costs of i�sur
ance into two categories:· (1) measurement costs and (2) transaction costs. The
first consists of the costs of estimating (a) the probability that the risk will materialize
and (b) the magnitude of the loss if the risk does materialize. The product of
the two is the expected value of the loss and is the basis for computing the
appropriate insurance premium that will be built into the contract price . . . . The
main transaction cost is that of pooling the risk with other risks to reduce or
eliminate it; where self-insurance is feasible, this cost may be lower than if market
insurance has to be purchased. . . .
This analysis is helpful for understanding the doctrine of impossibility and
rel�ted grounds for discharging a contract. It explains, for example, why physical
impossibility as such is not a ground for discharge. If the promisor is the cheaper
insurer, the fact that he could not have prevented the occurrence of the event
not discharge him. Conversely, the
that prevented him from perfonning should
.
fact that performance remains physically possible, but is uneconomical, should
not ipso facto defeat discharge. If the promisor could not have prevented at reason
able cost the event that has prevented him from fulfilling his promise and the
promisee was the cheaper insurer of the resulting loss, the promisor has a good
argument that he did not break the contract. So impossibility is ill-named-but
maybe not, because it dramatizes the critical fact that mere difficulty or unforeseen
expense of performance is not an excuse for failure to perform. Ordinarily, a
fixed-price contract is intended to assign to the performing party the risk of problems
encountered in performance, since that party is better able to overcome them.
Discharge is routinely allowed in personal service contracts where the death
of the promisor prevents performance, unless the promisor had reason to believe
(and failed to warn the promisee) that his life expectancy was less than normal
for someone of his age. The event, death, is probably not preventable at reasonable
cost by either party, but the proniisee is the cheaper insurer; although both parties
are in an equally good position to estimate the probability of the promisor's death,
the promisee is in a better position to estimate the cost to him if the promisor
is unable to provide the agreed-upon services.
Another example is a contract to drill for water. The contractor who, because
of unexpectedly difficult soil conditions, is unable to complete performance ·at
the cost he projected is not excused. He probably is the superior insurer, even
if he could not have anticipated the soil conditions. He will know better than
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the promisee both the likelihood, and the consequences for the costs of drilling,
of encountering subsoil conditions that make drilling difficult. He may also be
able to self-insure at low cost because he does a lot of drilling in different areas
and the risks of encountering unexpectedly difficult conditions are independent.
Now suppose a grower agrees before the growing season to sell hi$ crop
to a grain elevator, and the crop is destroyed by blight. Should the grower be
excused from liability? Probably. He has every incentive to avoid a blight, so
if it occurs, it probably could not have been prevented; and the grain elevator,
which doubtless buys from a variety of growers, not all of whom will be hit
by blight in the same growing season, is in a better position to buffer the risk
of blight than the grower is-though it must be added that in this age of future
contracts both parties may be able to insure against the loss quite inexpensively.
Often parties will include in their contract a force majeure ("greater force")
clause. specifying the circumstances in which failure to perform will be excused.
If they do, should impossibility, impracticability, and related judicial doctrines
be applicable to the contract?
Examples of the operation of these doctrines could be multiplied, but instead
let us consider the related case where completion of performance by one of the
parties is prevented, again by circumstances beyond his control, and that ·party
wants to be excused from further performance or even wants to_ be. paid for what
he has done although it is �ot what the contract called for him to do. I hire
a contractor to build a house and midway through construction the building burns
down. The contractor demands to be paid for the material and labor that he expended
on the construction or, alternatively, refuses to rebuild the house without a new
contract. The fact that he was prevented through no fault of his own from performing
as contemplated by the contract should not automatically entitle him to cancel
it or to be paid as if the burned-down building had been what I contracted for.
The issue should be which of us was intended to bear the risk of fire. In the
absence of evidence of the parties' actual intentions, we have to compare relative
costs of preventing or insuring against fire. Like a manufacturer whose goods
are destroyed by fire before delivery, the contractor generally is better placed
for fire protection than the owner because he controls the premises and is knowledge
able about the fire hazards of buildings under construction.
[Footnotes omitted.]

TREBILCO CK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT

(1993), pp. 135-136

Posner and Rosenfield ["Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law:
_An Economic Analysis" (1977), 6 J. of Leg. Stud. 83] acknowledge that often
(I would be inclined to argue, typically) the criteria they propose for identifying
the most efficient insurer or risk-bearer will point in opposite directions - one
party is better placed to estimate the probability of a given contingency materializing
(typically the party whose performance is in issue); the other party, who is to
receive the performance in issue, can better evaluate the magnitude of the loss
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if the contingency does materialize; and either party may be better placed to
diversify away or absorb the risk through self-insurance, market insurance, or,
more. debatably, superior wealth. Uncertainties surrounding these issues are likely
to render judicially detennined insurance extremely expensive compared with most
forms of explicit first-party insurance. Moreover, in contractuai settings such as
entailed in the frustration cases, at least in the absence of major information asymme
tries between the parties, it is not clear that the courts are likely to improve
on the risk allocations of the parties by engaging in highly particularistic ex post
assignments of losses. A clear, albeit austere, rule of literal contract enforcement
in most cases provides the clearest signal to parties to future contractual relationships
as to when they might find it mutually advantageous to contract away from the
rule.

· [Footnotes omitted.]
NOTE

See also Kull, "Mistake, Frustration and the Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies" (1991),
43 Hastings L.J. I; Triantis, "Contractual Allocations of Unknown rusks" (1992), 42 U.T.L.J. 450.

2. Develop�ent and Application of the Doctrine
l>ARADINE v. JANE

(1647), Aley� 26, 82 E.R. 8�7, Sty. 47; 82 E.R. 519 (K.B.)

[Paradlne had leased certain lands to Jane and brought this action in debt
for rent which the defendant had failed to pay. The action occurred during the
period of the English Civil War and, in response to it, the defendant pleaded]
that Prince Rupert, an alien, and an enemy of the King invaded the land with ·
an army, and with divers armed men did enter upon him, and did drive away
his cattell, and expelled him from the lands let unto him by the plaintiff, and
kept him out that he could not enjoy the lands for such a time. [His counsel
argued strenuously that] by the law of reason it seems the defendant in our case
ought not to be charged with the rent, because he could not enjoy that that was
let to him, and it was no fault of his own that he could not.
ROLL J. . . . When the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge
upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident
by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract.
And therefore if the lessee covenant to repair a house though it be burnt by
lightning or thrown down by enemies, yet be ought to repair it. . . . Another reason
was added, that as the lessee is to have the advantage of casual profits, so he
must run the hazard of casual losses, and not lay the whole burthen of them
upon his lessor; and though the land be surrounded or gained by the sea, or
made barren by wildfire, yet the lessor shall have his whole rent.
[Judgment for plaintiff.]
NOTE and QUESTION
l . The above extract is taken from a combination of two private reports of the case.
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For discussions of the. curious history of how Paradine v. Jane became a leading case see Page,
'The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance" (1919-1920), 1 8 Michigan L. Rev.
589 and Swan, 'The Allocation of Risk in the Analysis of Mistake and Frustration" in Reiter and
Swan, Studies in Contract Law (1980) 1 8 1 at 185 footnote 13. See also, more generally, Treitel,
Frustration and Force Majeure (1994) Ch. 2.
2. Is the rule in Paradine v. Jane excessively harsh? What would have been the result if the
lessee had been willing to ta1ce up possession of the premises, but the lessor had been prevented
by the Civil War from delivering them up?

TAYLOR v. CALDWELL

(1863), 3 B. & S. 826, 122 E.R. 309 (Q.B.)

I
I

\
1

BLACKBURN J. [delivering the judgment of the cow:t] In this case the plain
tiffs and defendants had, on the 27th May, 1861, entered into a contract by which
the defendants agreed to let the plaintiffs have the use of The Surrey Gardens
and Music Hall on four days then_ to come, viz., the 17th June, 15th July, 5th
August and 19th August, for the purpose of giving a series of four grand concerts,
and day and night fetes at the Gardens and Hall on those days respectively; and
the plaintiffs agreed to take the Gardens and Hall on those days, and pay 1001
for each day.
. . . The agreement then proceeds to set out various stipulations between the
parties as to what each was to supply for these concerts and entertainments, and
as to the manner in which they should be carried on. The effect of the whole
is to shew that the existence of the Music Hall in the Surrey Gardens in a state
fit for a concert was essential for the fulfilment of the contract,-such entertainments
as the parties contemplated in their agreement could not be given without it.
After the making of the agreement, and before the first day on which a
concert was to be given, the Hall was destroyed by fire. This destruction� we
must take it on the evidence, was without the fault of either party, and was so
complete that in consequence the concerts could not be given as intended. And
the question we have to decide is whether, under these circumstances, the loss
which the plaintiffs have sustained is to fall upon the defendants. The parties
when framing their agreement evidently had not present to their minds the possibility
of such a disaster, and have made no express stipulation with reference to it,
so that the answer to the question must depend upon the general rules of law
applicable to such a contract.
There seems no doubt that where there is a positive contract to do a thing,
not in itself unlawful, the contrac�or must perform it or pay damages for not
doing it, although in consequence of unforeseen accidents, the performance of
his contract has become unexpectedly burthensome or even impossible. . . . But
this rule is only applicable when the contract is positive and absolute, and not
subject to any condition either express or implied: and there are authorities which,
as we think, establish the principle that where, from the nature of the contract,
it appears that the parties must from the beginning have known that it could
not be fulfilled unless when the time for fulfilment of the · contract arrived some
particular specified thing continued to exist, _so that, when entering the contract,
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they must have contemplated such continuing existence as the foundation of what
was to be done; there, in the absence of any express or implied warranty tha·t
the thing shall exist, the contract is not to be construed as a positive contract,
but as subject to an implied condition that the parties shall be excused in case,
before breach, performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing
without default of the contractor.
There seems little doubt that this implication tends to further the great object
of making the legal construction such as to fulfil the intention of those who entered
into the contract. For in the course of affairs men in making such contracts in
general would, if it were brought to their minds, say that there should be such
a condition. . . .
There is a class of contracts in which a person binds himself to do something
which requires to be performed by him in person; and such promises, e.g. promises
to many, or promises to serve for a certain time, are never in practice qualified
by an express exception of the death of the party; and -therefore in such cases
the contract is in terms broken if the promisor dies before fulfilment. Yet it was
very early determined that, if the performance is personal, the executors are not
liable. .. . [Thus, a learned author states,]
if an author undertakes to compose a work, and dies before completing it, his executors are
discharged from this contract: for the undertaking is merely personal in Its nature, and, by
the intervention of the contractor's death, has become impossible to be performed.

. . . . In Hall v. Wright ((1859), 120 E.R. 688 at 695], Crompton J., in his
judgment, puts another case.
Where a contract depends upon personal skill, and the act of God renders it impossible,
as, for instance, in the case of a painter employed to paint a picture who is struck blind, it
may be that the performance might be excused.

It seems that in those cases the only ground on which the parties or their
executors, can be excused from the consequences of the breach of the contract
is, that from the nature of the contract there is an implied condition of the continued
existence of the life of the contractor, and, perhaps in the case of the painter
of his eyesight. . . .
It may, we think, be safely asserted to be now English law, that in all contracts
of loan of chattels or bailments if the performance of the promise of the borrower
or bailee to return the things lent or bailed, becomes impossible because it has
perished, this impossibility (if not arising from the fault of the borrower or bailee
from some risk which he has taken upon himself) excuses the borrower or bailee
from the performance of his · promise to re,deliver the chattel. . . .
In none of these cases is the promise in words other than positive, nor is
there any express stipulation that the destruction of the person or thing shall excuse
the performance; but that excuse is by law implied, because from the nature of
the contract it is apparent that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued
existence of the particular person or chattel. In the present case, looking at the
whole contract, we find that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued
existence of the Music Hall at the time when the concerts were to be given;
that being essential to their performance.
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We think, therefore, that the Music Hall having ceased to exist, without fault
of either party, both parties are excused, the plaintiffs from talcing the Gardens
and paying the money, the defendants from performing their promise to give the
use of the Hall and Gardens and other things.

NOTE
Statute law also has dealt with the issue of destruction of the subject matter. Section 9 of The
1989, c. 408 provides the following presumptive rule:

Sale ofGoods Act, R.S.N.S.

Where there is an agreement to sell specific goods and subsequently the goods without any
fault on the part of the seller or buyer, perish before the risk passes to the buyer, the agreement
is avoided.
Two points might be noted. First, this rule only applies to specific goods, thus if the goods are
sold by description there is no frustration and the risk is on the seller who must still supply. the
goods. Secondly, if property has passed to the buyer before the goods perish, even though the goods
are not in the buyer's possession, the contract is not frustrated because the main purpose of the
contract has been fulfilled - the transfer of ownership.

CAN. GOVT. :MERCHANT MARINE LTD. v. CAN. TRADING CO.
64 S.C.R. 106, (1922] 3 W.W.R. 197, 68 D.L.R. 5.44
The appellants contracted with the Canadian Trading Company (the respon
dent) to transport lumber from Vancouver to Australia in two vessels, the Canadian
Prospector and th·e Canadian Inventor. To the knowledge of both parties, the ships
were, at the time of contracting, under construction for the appellants. Apparently,
because of a dispute between the appellants and the shipbuilders, the vessels were
not ready in time and the contracted voyage could not be made. In an action
by the Canadian Trading Company, the appellants claimed, inter alia, that their
contract had been frustrated because the ships were unfit for sailing at the time
set for performance.
DUFF J. .. . The principle of Taylor v. Caldwell [supra] has unquestionably
been extended to cases in which parties having entered into a contract in terms
unqualified it is found when the time for performance arrives, that a state of
things contemplated by both parties as essential to performance according to the
true intent of both of them fails to exist. For the purpose of deciding whether
a particular case falls within the principle you must consider the nature of the
contract and the circumstances in which it was made in order to see from the
nature of the contract whether the parties must have made their bargain on the
footing that a particular thing or state of facts should be in existence when the
time for performance should occur. And if reasonable persons situated as the
parties were must have agreed that the promisor's c.ontractual obligations should
come to an end if that state of circumstances should not exist then a term to
that effect may be implied . ... But it is most important to rem�mber that no
such term should be implied when it is possible to hold that reasonable men
could have contemplated the talcing the risk of the circumstances being what they
in fact pr<:>ved to be when the time for performance arrived.
The doctrine of English law is that generally a promisor except to the extent
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to which his promise is qualified warrants his ability to perform it and this notwith
standing he may thereby make himself answerable for the conduct of other
persons. . ..
The contracts were made on the 19th of March and provided for shipment
at the end of April or the beginning of May. Is there anything in the circumstances
affording a ground for saying that the agents of appellant and of the respondent
as reasonable men could not have contracted on the footing that the appellants
should assume the risk of what subsequently happened?
It is important to remember that there is no evidence to indicate that the
del�y was due to any extraordinary occurrence, to anything outside the ordinary
course of events. There is a �uggestion of a strike and there is a suggestion of
a dispute between the Government and the contractors who were building the
ships. The respondents were not aware of the precise relations between the appellants
and the contractors and were entitled to assume that the contractors in entering
into the contract were duly talcing into account the possibilities incidental to those
relations. There was nothing in the facts known to them making it unreasonable
from the respondents' point of view that they should expect an undertaking as
touching the date of sailing unqualified, at all events, in respect of any of the
matters which have been suggested as accounting for the appellants• default. Real
impossibility of performance arising from destruction of the ships by fire, for
example, would have presented a different case. There is nothing in the evidence
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the impossibility which no doubt did arise
at the last moment was due to lack of energy on part of the Government or
to supineness or indifference on part of the appellants. Impossibility arising from
such causes is not the impossibility contemplated by the case of Taylor v. Caldwell.
MIGNAULT J. [concurring] . . . It seems to me . . . that the contingency which
relieves a party from performing a contract on the ground of impossibility of
performance, is an unforeseen event. . . .

So that if the event which causes the impossibility could have been anticipated
and guarded against in the contract, the party in default cannot claim relief because
it has happened. .. .
But here the appellant undertook to carry a cargo on a ship nearing completion.
It could certainly have been foreseen that something might occur in the ship yard,
especially in these days of labour troubles, to delay completion, and by making
; an absolute contract without providing against the contingency of non-completion
. in time, the appellant, in my opinion, assumed the risk of this contingency. The
! respondent prepared all its cargo for the ship in time and would be subject to
I.! considerable loss if the appellant were relieved from the consequences of non-performance. Such a condition, if it had been stipulated, might not have been accepted
1
by
the respondent, which possibly would have preferred to ship its lumber through
\
I another steamship company. And I think that the risk of such a contingency cannot
I be imposed on the respondent as an implied condition now that the loss has
occurred.
[ldington, Anglin and Brodeur JJ. delivered concurring judgments dismissing
the appeal.]
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NOTES and QUESTION
I. An example of the tendency of courts to place the risk of unforeseen developments on tht
promisor is provided by Graham v. Wagman ( 1976), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 667, appeal allowed as to measure
of damages 89 D.L.R. (3d) 282 (Ont. C.A.). The defendants agreed to lease to the plaintiffs 15(
parking spaces in a building which they intended to erect. However, the defendants were unable
to proceed with the building, because they failed to obtain the necessary financing. Their argument
that this failure excused their breach of contract met with no success. Weatherston J. commented
at 352: "I have never heard that impecuniosity is an excuse for non-performance of a promise."
2. In O'Connell v. Harkema Express Lines Ltd. '( 1982), 141 D.L.R. (3d) 291 (Ont. Co: Ct.), a
strike which forced a trucking company out of business was found to have frustrated the contract
of employment of the company's sales manager. But compare St. John v. TNT Canada (1991), 56
B.C.L.R. (2d) 3l t (S.C.).
3. In the well-known consideration case of Smith v. Dawson (1923), 53 O.L.R. 615 (C.A.), the
plaintiff contractors agreed to build a house for the defendant for $6,464. When the house was aJmost
complete, a fire occurred, causing considerable damage. The defendant had insured the house and
some furniture which she had moved in, 1µ1d she received $2,150 � the insurers. The plaintiffs
effected no insurance, but the defendant asked them to go ahead and complete the work on the basis
that she would pay over the insurance money to them. Upon completion, the defendant refu,sed to
pay the insurance money and the plaintiffs claim to it was denied on the ground that the only consider
ation provided by the contractors for this· promise was the performance of that which they were
already legally obliged to do. In the case, Middleton J. commented: "In the absence of any provision
to the contrary in the contract, the destruction of the building by fire would not afford any excuse
for non-performance of the contract." Why is this the case? In practice, how would you expect contractors
to react to this definition of their obligations?

CLAUDENEON GENERAL ADVERTISING LTD. v. SING
[1942] 1 D.L.R. 26 (N.S. S.C.)

DOULL J. This action is brought by the plaintiff for rentals alleged to be
due by the defendant in respect of an advertising sign of the kind usually known
as a Neon Sign, that is an electrical sign equipped with fixtures for lighting the
same with a type of electric lights.
The parties entered into an agreement in • w riting on June 23, 1939, under
which the plaintiff agreed to construct, and when constructed to lease to the defen
dant, a sign to be erected on the building .. . which was occupied by the defendant
as "Oriental Cafe Parlor". The defendant was to pay a rental of $13 per month
to the plaintiff for a term of 60 months. The plaintiff was to install the sign
and keep it in repair but the defendant was to pay. for the electric power. There
was nothing in the agreement to release the defendant from payment of the rentals
on the happening of any contingency.
Canada entered the present war on September 10, 1939 and on September
18, 1�39 certain lighting restrictions were imposed by competent authority in
the district in which the defendant's cafe is situate [which included a prohibition
against the use of lighted outdoor signs between sunset and sunrise]. . . .
The defendant admits that, if there . were no such restrictions, the amount
claimed in the statement of claim, viz. $234, would be due. He tenders $27.73
as the amount due to September 18, 1939 and says that the carrying out of the
contract has become impossible by a change of the law and in effect that he
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is relieved from further payment on the principles established by the cases which
are referred to as cases of frustration. . . .
Since the beginning of the present century, these rules have been considerably
extended and the doctrine which has been applied has been called frustration.
There are two classes of these cases: ( 1) The "Coronation Cases," in which the
contract could be carried out but the circumstances which formed its basis had
wholly changed; (2) Cases in which · a change in the law or the advent of war
involved such a fundamental change in the contract that it might be said that
any contract that could be carried out would essentially differ from what the
parties had in contemplation.
In Krell v. Henry, (1 903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.), the defendant had made an
agreement to hire certain rooms of the plaintiff which would provide a view of
the Coronation procession of King Edward VII. Owing to the illness of the King,
the procession was canceUed and it was held that the contract was thereby frustrated.
Vaughan Williams L.J. in the Court of Appeal said (p. 749):
I think that you first have to ascertain, not necessarily from the terms of the contract,
but, if required, from necessary inferences, drawn from surrounding circumstances recognized
by both contracting parties, what is the substance of the contract, and then to ask the question
whether the substantial contract needs for its foundation the assumption of the existence of
a particular state of things.

In Bell v. Lever Bros. Ltd. [supra, Chapter 9, section 3(a)], Lord Atkin says:

The implications to be made are to be no more than are 'necessary' for giving business
efficacy to the transaction, and it appears to me that, both as to existing facts and future facts,
a condition would not be implied unless the new state of facts make the contract something
different in kind from the contract in the original state of facts. Thus, in Krell v. Henry, Vaughan
Williams L.J. finds that the subject _or" the contract was 'rooms _to view the procession': the
postponement. therefore, made the rooms not rooms to view the procession. This also is the
test finally chosen by Lord Sumner in Bank line v. Capel (A.) & Co., [1919] A.C. 435 (H.L.),
· where dealing with the criterion for determining the effect of interruption in 'frustrating' a
contract, he says: 'An interruption may be so long as to destroy the identity of the work or
service, when resumed, with the work" or service when interrupted.' We therefore get a common
standard for mutual mistake, and implied conditions whether as to existing or as to future facts.
Does the state of the new facts destroy the identity of the subject matter as it was in the
original state of facts?

Later the Judicial Committee in Maritime Nat. Fish Ltd. v. Ocean Trawlers
Ltd. [infra, section 3], said:

This case is more analogous to such a case as Krell v. Henry, where the contract was
for the hire of a window for a particular day: it was not expressed but it was mutually understood
that the hirers wanted the window in order to view the Coronation procession: when the procession
was postponed by reason of the unexpected illness of King Edward, it was held that the contract
was avoided by that .event: the person who was letting the window was ready and willing
to place it at the hirer's disposal on the agreed date; the hirer, however, could not use it for
the purpose which he desired. It was held that the contract was dissolved because the basis
of the contract was that the procession should take place as contemplated.

The correctness of this decision has been questioned, for instance, by Lord Finlay
L.C:, in Larrinaga & Co. v. Societe Franco-Americaine des Phosphates de Medulla
(1923), 39 T.L.R. 3 1 6 at p. 318, Lord Finlay observes:
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It may be that the parties contracted in the expectation that a particular event would happen,
each taking his chance, but that the actual happening of the event was not made the basis
of the contract.
The authority is certainly not one to be extended: it is particularly difficult to apply where
. . . the possibility of the event . . . was known to both parties when the contract was made,
but the contract entered into was absolute in terms so far as concerned that known possibility.
It may be asked whether in such cases there is any reason to throw the los,s on those who
have undertaken to place the thing or service . . . at the other parties• disposal and are able
and willing to do so.

It is worth while noting that in the same volume of reports one of the '�Corona
tion Cases" was decided differently from Krell v. Henry by the same Court. Herne
Bay Steam Boat Co. v. Hutton, (1903] 2 K.B. 683 (C.A.), where the defendant
had chartered a ship to take a party of persons to see the Naval Review and
for a day's cruise around the fleet following the King's Coronation. The Naval
Review did not take place and the defendant repudiated the contract. It was held
that the venture was · at the defendant's risk and that there was not total failure
of consideration or subject matter. The defendant could have had the cruise around
the fleet although he would not have seen any Naval Review. The plaintiff therefore
recovered. .. .
I n the case which we are considering, the neon sign was constructed for
the purposes of the defendant, it was erected on the defendant's premises and
was operated for some time. The monthly rental was for the purpose of paying
the cost of construction and erection as well as majntenance over a period of
60 months. No part of the contract between the· parties became impossible. The
defendant certainly gets very much less benefit from the sign, but it is not entirely
useless as a daylight sign. The lighting of it, even when legal, is a matter for
the defendant. It is true that the defendant does not get an illuminated sign and
in that respect the case approaches Krell v. Henry; but having regard to the remarks
concerning Krell v. Henry in the Trawlers case, I do not think that I should say
that the contract is for an illuminated sign. The Herne Bay case was not so very
different from Krell v. Henry, but it was there held that the charterer took the
risk.
[Judgment for the plaintiff.]

NOTES and QUESTIONS
l . Sir Frederick Pollock commented on the Herne Bay case: "In point of fact the fleet was
still there, as Stirling L.J. observed, and as the writer of these lines can bear witness, it was very
well worth seeing without the review." See "Note" (1904), 20 L.Q.R. 3 at 4.
2. Seller sold land to Buyer and reserved the right to remove from the property within five
years a historic barn. One year later, the provincial government designated the barn a heritage property
and refused to allow its removal. Does Seller have any remedy? See Some Fine Investments Ltd.
v. Ertolahti (1991), 107 N.S.R. (2d) l (T.0.}.
3. The coronation cases are some of the most· controversial in the law of frustration. Do you
believe that the allocation of risk approach advocated by the authors at the beginning of this chapter
can provide detenninative results? For further discussions see Posner and Rosenfield, "Impossibility
and Related Doctrines in�Contract Law: An Economic Analysis" (1977), 6 J. of Legal Studies 83
at 1 10-1 1 1; Reiter, Comment ()978), 56 Can. Bar Rev 98 at 1 13; Swan, "The Allocation of Risk
in the Analysis of Mistake and Frustration" in Reiter & Swan, Studies in Contract Law (1980) 181

J
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at 210-2 12. For a feminist critique of the "cockiness" of Posner's economic analysis see Frug, "Rescuing
· 1mpossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law" (1991-92), 140 U. Pa. L. Rev.
: : . 1029 at 1034-41 .
4. Do you think that the difference between Krell v. Henry and Herne Bay v. Hutton can be
· ·explained by the fact that Henry was a consumer while Hutton was a business person who was
? biring the boat to take other paying consumers to see the fleet? (See Brownsword, "Towards a Rational
: Law of Contract" in Wilhelmsson, ed., Perspectives of Critical Contract Law (1993) 242 at 246-7).
Why do you think this fact is not addressed in traditional accounts of the case?

DAVIS CONTRACTORS LTD. v. FAREHAM U.D.C.
( 1 956] A.C. 696, [ 1 956] 2 All E.R. 1 45 (H.L.)

In July, 1 946, the plaintiff contractors entered into a building contract to
build 78 houses for the defendant municipality within a period of eight months.
The contract price was fixed at £92,425. Owing to unexpected circumstances,
and without fault of either party, adequate supplies of labour were not available
in the post-war market and the work took 22 months to complete. The contractors
claimed, in part, that the contract was frustrated and that they were entitled to
a sum of money on a quantum meruit basis in addition to the contract price.
LORD RADCLIFFE . .. I do not think that there has been a better expression
of. that general idea [of frustration] than the one offered by Lord Loreburo in
Tamplin (F.A. ) SS. Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co. Ltd., [1 916]
2 A.C. 397 at 403 (C.A.). -It is shorter to quote than to try to paraphrase it:
. . . a court can and ought to examine the contract and the circumstances in which it was made,
not of course to vary, but only to explain it, in order to see whether or not from the nature
of it the parties must have made their bargain on the footing that a particular thing or state
of things would continue to exist. And if they must have done so, then a term to that . effect
will be implied, though it be not expressed in_ the contract. . . . no court has an absolving power,
but it can infer from the nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances that a condition
which is riot expressed was a foundation on which the parties contracted.

i
I
f

I

f
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So expressed, the principle of frustration, the origin of which seems to lie in
the development of commercial law, is seen to be a branch of a wider principle
which forms part of the English law of contract as a whole. But, in my opinion,
full weight ought to be given to the requirement that the parties "must have made"
their bargain on the particular footing. Frustration is not to be lightly invoked
as the dissolvent of a contract.
Lord Loreburn ascribes the dissolution to an implied term of the contract
that was actually made. Th.is approach is in line with the tendency of English _
courts to r�fer all the consequences of a contract to the will of those who made
it. But there is something of a logical difficulty in seeing how the parties . could
even impliedly have provided for something which ex hypothesi they neither
expected nor foresaw; and. the ascription of frustration to an implied term of
the contract has been criticized as obscuring the true action of the court which
consists in applying an objective rule of the law of contract to the contractual
obligations that the parties have imposed upon themselves. So long as each theory
produces the same result as the other, as normally it does, it matters little which
theory is avowed. But it may still be of some importance to recall that, if the
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matter is to be approached by way of implied term, the solution of any particular
case is not to be found by inquiring what the parties themselves would have
agreed on had they been, as they were not, forewarned. It is not merel y that
no one can answer that hypothetical question: it is also that the deci�ion must
be given "irrespective of the individuals concerned, their temperaments and failings,
their interest and circumstances." The legal effect of frustration "does not depend
on their intention or their opinions, or even knowledge, as to the event." On the
contrary, it seems that when the event occurs "the meaning of the contract must
be taken to be, not what t�e parties did intend (for they had neither thought
nor intention regarding it), but that which the parties, as fair and reasonable men,
would presumably have agreed upon if, having such possibility in view, they had
made express provisions as to their several rights and liabilities in the event of
its occurrence" [Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin & Co. (1881), 6 App. Cas. 38 (H.L.)
per Lord Watson).
By this time it might seem that the parties themselves have become so far
disembodied spirits that their actual persons should be allowed to rest in peace.
In their place there rises the figure of the fair and reasonable man. And the
spokesman of the fair and reasonable man, who represents after all no more than
the anthropomorphic conception of justice, is and must be the court itself. So
perhaps it would be simpler to say at the outset that frustration occurs whenever
the law recognizes that without default of either party a contractual obligation
has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which
performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that
which was undertaken by the contract. Non haec in foedera veni. It was not this
that I promised to do.
There is, however, no uncertainty as to the materials upon which the court
must proceed.
The data for decision are, on the one hand, the terms and construction of the contract,
read in the light of the then existing circumstances, and on the other hand the events which
have occurred.

I
I
.
'

(Denny, Mon & Dickson Ltd. v. Fraser (James B.) & Co. Ltd., [1944] A.C. 265
at 274 (H. L.), per Lord Wright). In the nature of things there is often no room
for any elaborate inquiry. The court must act upon a general impression of what
its rule requires. It is for that-reason that special importance is necessarily attached
to the occurrence of any unexpected event that, as it were, changes the face of
things. .But, even so, · it is not hardship or inconvenience or material loss itself
which calls the principle of frustration into play. There must be as well such
a change in the significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would,
if performed, be a different thing froin that contracted for.
I am bound to say that, if this is the law, the appellants' case seems to
me a long way frorri .a case of frustration. Here is a building contract entered
into by a housing authority and a big firm of contractors iil all the uncertainties
of the post-war world. Work was begun shortly before the formal contract was
executed and continued, with impediments and minor stoppages but without actual
interruption, until the 78 houses contracted for had all been built. After the work
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had been in progress for a time the appellants raised the claim, which they repeated
more than once, that they ought to be paid a larger sum for their work than
the contract allowed; but the respondents refused to admit the claim and, so far
as appears, no conclusive action was taken by either side which would make
the conduct of one or the other a determining element in the
That is not in any obvious sense a frustrated contract. But the appellants'
argument, which certainly found favour with the arbitrator, is that at some stage
before completion the original contract was dissolved because it became incapable
of being performed according to its true significance and its place was taken
by · a new arrangement under which they were entitled to be paid, not the contract
sum, but a fair price on quantum nieruit for the work that they carried out during
the 22 months that elapsed between commencement and completion. The contract,
it is said, was an eight months' contr�ct, as indeed it was. Through no fault
of the parties it turned out that it took 22 months to do the work contracted
for. The main reason for this was that, whereas both parties had expected that
adequate supplies of labour and material would be available for completion in
eight months, the supplies that were in fact available were much less than adequate
for the purpose. Hence, it is said, the basis or the footing of the contract was
removed before the work was completed; or, slightly altering the metaphor, the
footing of the contract was so changed by the circumstance that the expected
supplies were not available t,hat the contract built upon that footing became void.
These are the findings which the arbitrator has recorded in his supplemental award.
In my view, these are in substance conclusions of law, and I do not think
that they are good law. All that anyone, arbitrator or court, can do is to study
the contract in the light of the circumstances that prevailed at the time when
it was made and, having done so, to relate it to the circumstances that are said
to have brought about its frustration. It may be a finding of fact that at the time
of making the contract both parties anticipated that adequate supplies of labour
and material would be available to enable the contract to be completed in the
stipulated time. I doubt whether it is, but, even if it is, it is no more than to
say that when one party stipulated for completion in eight months, and the other
party undertook it, each assumed that what was promised could be satisfactorily
performed. That is a statement of the obvious that could be made with regard
to most contracts. I think that a good deal more than that is needed to form
a "basis" for the principle of frustration.
The justice of the arbitrator's conclusion depends upon the weight to be
given to _the fact that this was a contract for specified work to be completed
in a fixed time at a price determined by those conditions. I think that his view
was that, if without default on either side the contract period was substantially
extended, that circumstance itself rendered the fixed price so unfair to the contractor
that he ought not to be held to his original price. I have much sympathy for
the contractor, but, in my opinion, if that sort of consideration were to be sufficient
to establish a case of frustration, there would be an untold range of contractual
obligations rendered uncertain and, possibly, unenforceable.
'Iwo things seem to me .to prevent the application of the principle of frustration
to this case. One is that the cause of the delay was not any new state of things
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which the parties could not reasonably be thought to have foreseen. On the contrary,
. the possibility of enough labour and materials not �eing available was before
their eyes and could have been the subject of special contractual stipulation. It
was not made so. The other thing is that, though timely completion wa� no doubt
important to both sides, it is not right to treat the possibility of delay as having
the same significance for each. The owner draws up his conditions in detail, specifies·
the time within which he requires completion, protects himself both by a penalty
clause for time exceeded and by calling for the deposit of a guarantee bond and
offers a certain measure of security to a contractor by his escalator clause with
regard to wages and prices. In the light of these conditions the contractor makes
his tender, and the tender must necessarily take into account the margin of profit
that he hopes to obtain upon his adventure and in that any appropriate allowance
for the · obvious risks of delay. To my mind, it is useless to pretend that the contractor
is not at risk if delay does occur, even serious delay. And I think it a misuse
of legal terms to call in frust;ration to get him out of his unfortunate predicament
[Viscount Simonds and Lords Morton, Reid and Sqmervell delivered judgments
dismissing the appeal.]
NOTE

Lord Radcliffe's test of "radical difference" has been specifically approved in a number of Canadian
courts, especially in construction cases. See, e.g., Peter Kiewit and Sons ' Co. v. Eakins Const. Ltd.,
(1960] S.C.R. 361 at 368; Swanson Const. Co. v. Govt. of Man. (1963), 40 D.L.R. (2d) 162 at 172,
affinned 47 W.W.R. 640 (S.C.C.); Elec. Power Equipment Ltd. v. R.C.A. Victor Co. ( 1 964), 46 D.L.R.
(2d) 722 (B.C. C.A.). It does not. however, represent the only modem description of the circumstances
in which a court will find a contract frustrated. · For example, in the Hong Kong Fir case, supra,
Chapter 7, section 7, Lord Diplock envisaged that an event which deprives a party of "substantially
the whole benefit" that it was intended to receive under a contract would relieve that party of its
duty of further _performance in cases of frustration, · as well as where there had been a breach of
an innominate term. In Bell v. Lever Brothers Ltd., supra, Chapter 9, section 3(a), lord Atkin contem
plated that the ..difference in kind" test would apply in the area of frustration as well as mistake.

CAPITAL QUALI T Y HOMES LTD. v. COLWYN CONSTRUCTION LTD.
(1975), 9·0.R. (2d) 617, 61 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.)

EVANS J.A. [4elivering . the judgment of the court] ...
Under an agreement dated January 15, 1969, the plaintiff, purchaser, agreed
to purchase from the defendant, vendor, 26 building lots each comprising parts
of lots within a registered plan of subdivision. The date fixed for dosing was
July 30, 1970. Both parties were aware that the purchaser was buying building
lots for the purpose of erecting a home on each lot with the intention of selling
the several homes by way of separate conveyances. Under the terms of the agreement
it was entitled to a conveyan�e- of a building lot upon payment of $6,000 and,
upon full payment, lo 26 separate deeds of conveyanc� each representing one
building lot. It is agreed that no demand for any conveyance was made prior
to the date of closing.
When the sale agreement was executed the designated land was not within
an area of subdivision control and not subject to any restriction limiting the right
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to convey. On June 27, 1 970, certai_n amendments . . . came into effect whereby
these lands came under the provisions of what is now s. 29 of the Planning Act,
R.S.0. 1 970, c. 349, which in certain circumstances restricts an owner's right
to convey and makes necessary the obtaining of a consent from the relevant
committee of adjustment designated in the amending legislation. In the absence
of such consent no interest in part of a lot within a regis�ered plan of subdivision
can be conveyed.
The vendor was accordingly precluded from conveying the 26 building lots
in 26 separate deeds without proper consents and while a conveyance to the
purchaser of all lots in one deed may have been permissible, the purchaser in
any event would be unable to reconvey individual building lots to prospective
home buyers as it had intended without complying with the restrictive provisions
of the new legislation.
This substantial change in the law, prohibiting and restricting conveyancing
of the lands 33 days prior to the anticipated closing date, resulted in some discussion
between the parties relative to possible postponement of the closing date in order
to devise some method of circumventing the restrictions to which the lands were
now subject. No arrangement was made to extend closing. On the agreed date
of closing tq.e purchaser insisted that the vendor d_eliver conveyances for each
individual building lot with the consents necessary to effectually transfer the lots.
The vendor insisted that it was the responsibility of the purchaser to obtain the
necessary consents. On the closing date the balance of the agreed purchase price
was tendered by the solicitors for the p_urchaser but no conveyances were forth
coming in the mode contemplated by the agreement. It is common ground that
the purchaser would Iiot withdraw its demand for 26 individual conveyances with
consents attached and that the vendor did not provide such conveyances. Following
failure to close on the agreed date, the purchaser contended that the vendor was
in default and on August 5, 1 970, repudiated the agreement. and made demand
upon the vendor for the return of the balance of the deposit.
Although the statement of facts agreed to by counsel does not state that
the relatively short period of time, 33 days, between the effective date of the
amending legislation and the stipulated closing date made impossible the obtaining
of the necessary consents, the argument indicated that such was the understanding
· and I have accordingly assumed that the time factor was so limited that the parties
were in agreement that it would have . been impossible to process the applications
for consents prior to the closing date. : . .
Accordingly, I propose to deal with _this appeal on the basis of the argument
advanced before us, i.e., on the doctrine of frustration and its applicability to
contracts involving the sale and purchase of land. . . .
[T]he appellant, ve_ndor, submitted that the supervening legislation which
' restricted transfer of the lots was a burden falling upon the purchaser. The argument
was that upon execution of an agreement for the sale of land the purchaser became
the equitable owner of the lands and any amending legislation which affected
either zoning or alienation of land was a burden to be assumed by the purchaser.
Accordingly, the purchaser was in error in attempting to repudiate the agreement
and could not recover the deposit paid.
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The respondent, purchaser, took the position that the effect of the new legisla
tion was to make impossible the fulfillment of the terms of the . contract; that
there was a failure of consideration and that equity would not force the purchaser
to take something fundamentally different from that for which it had bargained.
The vendor also argued that the obligation to obtain the consent of the
committee of adjustment rested upon the purchaser. I do not agr�. Unless otherwise
provided in the agreement of sale the vendor is required to convey a mark;etable
title in fee simple. There was no provision in the instant agreeme.nt which would
permit the vendor to escape from that normal obligation.
That default alone was sufficient to entitle the purchaser to the return of
its deposit.
There can be no frustration if the supervening event results from the voluntary .
act of one of the parties or if the possibility of such event arising during the
term of the agreement was contemplated by the parties and provided for in the
agreement In the instant case the planning legislation which supervened was not
contemplated bJ the parties, not provided for in the agreement and not brought
about through a voluntary act of either party. The factor remaining to be considered
is whether the effect of the planning legislation is of such a nature that the law
would consider the fundamental character of the agreement to have been so altered
as to no longer reflect the original basis of the agreement. In my opinion the
legislation destroyed the very foundation of the agreement. The purchaser was
purchasing 26 separate building lots upon which it proposed to build houses for
resale involving a reconveyance in each instance. This purpose was known to
the vendor. The lack of ability to do so creates a situation not within the contempla
tion of the parties when they entered the agreement. I believe that all the factors
necessary to constitute impossibility of performance have been established and
that the doctrine of frustration can be invoked to terminate the agreement. . . .
If the factual situation is such that there is a clear "frustration of the common
venture" then the contract, whether it is a contract for the sale of land or otherwise,
is at an end and the· parties are discharged from further performance and the
adjustment of the rights and liabilities of the parties are left to be determined
under the Frustrated Contracts Act. In my opinion, on the facts of this case,
the contract was frustrated; · the doctrine was applicable and should be invoked
with the result that both parties are discharged from performance of the contract
and the purchaser is entitled to recover the . full amount paid as it is not claimed
that the vendor incurred any expenses in connection with the performance of
the contract, prior to frustration, which would entitle it to retain a portion of
the money paid as provided for in s. 3(2) of the Frustrated Contracts Act. Accord
ingly, the vendor must refund (Q the purchaser the balance of the deposit money,
that 1s, $13,980.
[Appeal dismisst:d.]
NOTES and QUESTION
I. A section of this case dealing with the frustration of a contract which conveys an interest
in land is reproduced infra, in section 4 of this chapter.
2.Is there an alternative analysis by which the return of the purchaser's deposit might be justified?
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-----··-·--·-·

r

S. 2

DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE

681

3. In cases such as Capital Quality Homes, the date at which the contract . was frustrated is
clear. In others, the question is more complex. In Fine/vet A.G. v. Vinava Shipping Co., [1983] 2
All E.R. 658 (Q.B.D.), a chartered ship, the Chrysalis, was docked at the port of Basrah when, on
22nd September 1980, war broke out between Iran and Iraq. On 1st October the ship was ready
to leave, but it was prevented from doing so by the Iraqi port authorities and by the risk of damage
from the hostilities. On 14th November the charterers cancelled the charter party and the question
arose as to when the contract had become frustrated.
Mustill J. found that frustration depended, not on the declaration of war, but on the effect of
acts done in furtherance of the war. The court refused to disturb the arbitrator's finding that the
contract was not frustrated until 24th November when most informed people took the view that ships
would be unable to leave Basrah for several months and probably much longer.

VICTORIA WOOD DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. ONDREY
( 1 977), 14 O.R. (2d) 723, 1 R.P.R. 141, 74 D.L.R. (3d) 528 (H.C.)

The plaintiff, Victoria Wood, entered into a contract on 6th April 1973 to
purchase from the defendants 90 acres of land bordering the Queen Elizabeth
Way in Oakville, with the sale to be completed on 31st October 1 973. To the
knowledge of the defendants, the plaintiff intended to subdivide and develop the
land, but amendments to Ontario planning legislation, which were passed on 22nd
June 1 973, and regulations filed under the new legislation on 4th August 1 973
effectively brought the property within a restricted development area and precluded
its subdivision development. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the contract
was frustrated and the return of their deposit. They relied, inter alia, on the Capital
Quality Homes Ltd. .case.
OSLER J. [distinguishing Capital Quality Homes] . . . In my view, in the
present instance, "the very foundation of the agreement" has not been destroyed.
Though it was as I have found .well known to the vendor that the purchaser
intended to make commercial use of its property by some form of subdivision,
the agreement is in no sense made conditional upon the ability of the purchaser
to carry out its intention. The ..very foundation of the agreement" was that the
vendor would sell and the purchaser would buy the property therein described
upon the terms therein set out. The only obligations assumed by the vendor were
to provide a deed and to join in or consent to any subsequent applications respecting
the zoning and to give partial discharges of the mortgage it was taking back
under certain circumstances. The only obligation of the purchaser was · to complete
. the cash balance agreed to, execute and give back a mortgage and to pay such
mortgage in accordance with .i ts terms. Nothing in the supervening legislation
affects, in the slightest degree, the abilities of the parties to carry out their respective
obligations.
As it was put by counsel for the Ondreys, a . developer in purchasing land
is always consciom/of the risk that zoning or similar changes may make the
carrying out of his intention impossible, or may delay it. He may attempt to guard
against such risk by the insertion of proper conditions in the contract and thereby
persuade the vendor to assume some of the risk. In the present case he has not
done so and, indeed, there is no evidence that he has attempted to do so. 'The
very foundation of the agreement" is not affected and there is no room for the
application of the doctrine of frustration.
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Counsel for the Ondreys advanced as a secondary argument f.h.e proposition
that there is no absolute prohibition against development as now, some four years
after the passage of the legislation, it has been shown to be possible to make
application to a hearing board set .up by the Minister for a recommendation to
the Minister that any land affected by the legislation be exempted from such
effect. Had I found that the ability to develop the land had formed part of the
agreement between the parties, I would not have given effect to this second
argument. Under the legislation, no development is permitted and the fact that
it may, at some future time, become possible to persuade the Minister ex gratia
to exempt the lands, would not, in my view, have affected the matter if l had
found that development was at the heart of the agreement. ...
[The plaintiffs's action was dismissed and the vendors' concurrent action
for specific performance was successful. Affirmed (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) l , 7 R.P.R.
60, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 229 (C.A.).]
NOTE and QUESTION
1. Why was the "fundamental character" of the agreement altered in Capital Quality Homes,
but the ''very foundation of the agreement" not destroyed in Victoria Wood? For further examples
of decisions in which courts have found that an inability to obtain planning changes can amount
to frustration, see Focal Properties Ltd. v. George Wimpey (Canada) Ltd. (1975), 73 D.L.R. (3d)
387 (Ont. C.A.), affirmed [1978] l S.C.R. 2. and British Columbia (Minister of Crown Lands) v. Cressey
DevekJpment Corp., [1992] 4 W.W.R. 357 (B.C. S.C.). See also, Amalg. lnvt. &: Property Co. v. Walker
(John) &: Sons Ltd., (1976] 3 All E.R. 509 (C.A.), in which the purchaser agreed to buy a warehouse
for development purposes for £1,700,000. The next day, the building was designated a historic site,
which meant that it could not be redeveloped and reduced its value to £200,000. The purchaser's
argument of frustration failed, on the ground that the possibility that a building might be so designated
was an inherent risk which it had to bear.
2. Farmer agrees to scJl to Developer at a price of $3,000 per acre 160 acres of farmland, situated
in a restricted development area adjacent to Mettopolis. Between the date of the interim agreement
and the scheduled date of closing, the provincial legislature unexpectedly repeals its restricted develop
ment area legislation and the value of the land increases to $8,000 per acre. Does Farmer have any
remedy?

KESMAT INVT. INC. v.
INDUST. MACHINER Y CO. & CANADIAN INDEMNITY CO.
· (1986), 70 N.S.R. (2d) 341 (N.S. C.A.)

Industrial Machinery Co. (Industrial) obtained an easement from Kesmat to
enable it to build a sewer line across Kesmat's property. In exchange, lndustri_al
undertook to obtain a rezoning .and subdivision of Kesmat's lands and to pay
Kesmat $50,000 if it was unsuccessful in doing so. Canadian Indemnity issued
a bond in Kesmat's favour in the amount of $50,000 guaranteeing the performance
of Industrial's undertakings.
Industrial met with considerable difficulty in its rezoning application and
it became clear that before the application would be granted, Industrial . would
first have to conduct an environmental study. The cost of the study was estimated
at $25,000 to $50,000. Industrial did not carry out the study, and failed to obtain
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the rezoning. In an action by Kesmat to recover $50,000 from Industrial and
Canadian Indemnity, Glube C.J.T.D. at trial found that the contract was frustrated,
inter alia, by the requirement of an environmental study. Kesmat appealed.
MACDONALD J.A. [delivering the judgment of the court] ... It is clear
from the authorities that hardship, inconvenience or material loss or the fact that
the work has become more onerous than originally anticipated · are not sufficient
to amount to frustration in law so as to terminate a contract and relieve the parties
thereto of their obligations to each other: see Goldsmith, Canadian Building Con
tracts at p. 105. Courts have, however, interpreted impossibility of performance·
to encompass not only absolute impossibility but also impossibility in the sense
of impracticality of performance due to extreme and unreasonable difficulty,
expense, injury or loss. . ..
It is common knowledge that the public are becoming increasingly concerned
with protecting the environment from pollution, damage and deterioration. Ecolo
gists and environmentalists are constantly drawing attention to the need to conserve
our natural resources and to preserve our environment. As Chief Justice Glube
found, the requirement of an environmental impact report was not an unknown
requirement. It might well be said that even if such requiremen_t had been contem
plated by the parties they still would have entered into the contract they did.
In any event the requirement of the study was known to Industrial when the
last bond extension was obtained.
I have reached the following conclusions based on a consideration of the
relevant circumstances against the background of the applicable legal principles.
.
1. Requirement of an environmental impact report was' an intervening event
that made more onerous . and expensive performance by Industrial of its obligations
to Kesmat. The cost of the study, however, based on the evidence, has not been
shown to be so onerous or unreasonable so as to render performance of the contract
impractical-it simply cannot be said that the cost of the study is so enormous
"that no man of common sense would incur the outlay"-per Maule J. in Moss
v. Smith (1850), 137 E.R. 827 at 831 .
2. The requirement of such study or report was not an unheard of request.
It was one that . . . Industrial, prior to the last extension of both the principal
agreement and the bond, knew or ought to have known might be made. It follows
that the request for such study or report is not so catastrophic an intervening
event as to justify the invocation of the doctrine of frustration. . . .
It is clear that the rezoning and resubdivision was not completed in accordance
with the terms of the agreement as extended. The appellant contends that there
was therefore a default by Industrial which activated the penal provisions of the
principal agreement and of the bond.
[Kesmat was found to be entitled to judgment in the amount of $50,000
against Industrial and Canadian Indemnity. Appeal allowed.]

--· --------------
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3. Self-Induced Frustration
MARITIME NATIONAL FISH LTD. v. OCEAN TRAWLERS LTD.
[1935) A.C. 524, (1935] 2 W.W.R. 606, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 12 (P.C.)

In July 1932, the appellants chartered a trawler, the St. Cuthbert, from the
respondents for a period of one year, commencing 25th October 1932 at a rate
of $590 per month.
LORD WRIGHT [�elivering the judgment of the court] . . . When the parties
entered into the new agreement in July, 1932, they were well aware of certain
legislation consisting of an amendment of the Fisheries Act . . . which in substance
made it a punishable offence to leave or depart from any port in Canada with
intent to fish with a vessel that uses an otter or other similar trawl for catching
fish. except under licence from the Minister: it was left to the Minister to determine
the number of such vessels eligible to be licensed, and Regulations were to be
made defining the conditions in respect of licences . .. .
The St. Cuthbert was a vessel which was fitted with, and could only operate
as a trawler with, an otter trawl.
The appellants, in addition to the St. Cuthbert, also operated four other trawlers,
all fitted with otter trawling gear.
On March 11, 1933, the appellants applied to the Minister of Fisheries for
licences for the trawlers they were operating, and in so doing complied with
all the requirements of the Regulations, but on April 5, 1933, the Acting Minister
replied that it had been decided (as had shortly before been announced in the
House of Commons) that licences were only to be granted to three of the five
trawlers operated by the . appellants: he accordingly requested the appellants to
advise the Department for which three of the five trawlers they desired to have
licences. The appellants thereupon gave the names of three trawlers other than
the St. Cuthbert, and .for. these three trawlers licences were issued, but no licence
was granted for the St. Cuthbert. In consequence, as from April 30, 1933, it was
no longer lawful for the appellants to employ the St. Cuthbert as a trawler in
their business. On May 1, 1933, the appellants gave notice that the St. Cuthbert
was available for redelivery to the respondents; they claimed that they were no
longer bound,by the charter.
On June 19, 1933, the respondents commenced their action claiming $590.97
as being hire due under the charter for the month ending May 25, 1933: it is
agreed that if that claim is justified, hire at the same rate is also recoverable
for June, July, August, September and October, 1933.
[Lord Wright indicated that he would be inclined to concur with the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia in holding the contract was not frustrated
because the appellants, being aware of the legislation, took the risk that the necessary
licence would not be granted. However, the Judicial Committee disposed of the
case on the shorter ground that:] ... in their judgment the case could be properly
decided on the simple conclusion that it was the act and election of the appellants
which prevented the St. Cuthbert from being licensed for fishing with an otter
trawl. It is clear that the appellants were free to select any three of the five trawlers
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they were operating and could, had they willed, have selected the St. Cuthbert
as one, in which event a licence would have been granted to her. It is immaterial
to speculate why they preferred to put forward for licences the three trawlers
which they actually selected. Nor is it material, as between the appellants and
the respondents, that the appellants were operating other trawlers to three of which
they gave the preference. What matters is that they could have got a licence for
the St Cuthbert if they had so minded. If the case be figured as one in which
the St. Cuthbert was removed from the category of privileged trawlers, it was
by the appellants' hand that she was so removed, because it was their hand that
guided the hand of the Minister in placing the licences where he did and thereby
excluding the St. Cuthbert. The essence of "frustration" is that it should not be
due to the act (?r election of the party. .. .
• . . {T]heir Lordships are of opinion that the loss of the St. Cuthbert's licence
can correctly be described . . . as "a self induced frustration." . . . Lord Blackbum
in Dahl v. Nelson, Donkin & Co. (1881), 6 App. Cas. 38 at 53 (H.L.), . . . refers
to a ''frustration" as being a matter "caused by something for which neither party
was responsible" . . . [I]t cannot in their Lordships' judgment be predicated that
what is here claimed to be a frustration, that is, by reason of the withholding
of the licence, was a matter for which the appellants were not responsible or
which happen� without any default on their part. In truth, it happened in conse
quence of their election� If it be assumed that the performance of the contract
was dependent on a . licence being granted, it was that election which prevented
performance, and ori that assumption it was the appellants' own default which
frustrated the adventure: the appellants cannot rely on their own default to excuse
thein from liability under the contract.
QUESTIONS
I. In J. Lauritzen A.S. v. Wijsmuller B. V. (The "Super Servant Two"), [1989] I Lloyd's Rep.
148, affinned (1990] I Lloyd's Rep. f (C.A.), Lauritzen owned a l�ge and. heavy drilling rig, which
was under construction in Japan. Wijsmuller_ agreed to transPQrt the rig to the Rotterdam area of
the North Sea on one of its large semi-submersible, self-propelled barges. The rig was to be delivered
to Wijsmuller for carriage between June ·20 and August 20, 1981 and the transportation unit was
described in the contract as ..Super Servant One or Super Servant Two in Wijsmuller's option".
Ultimately, Wijsmuller planned to use Super Servant Two to transport the rig a,nd engaged Super
Servant One on other contracts for the period between June and August, 1981. On January 29, 1981,
Super Servant Two sank and was declared a total loss. On February 16, 1981, Wijsmuller informed
Lauritzen that they would not carry out the transportation of the rig and Lauritzen claimed damages
for breach of contract. Wijs.muller pleaded that the contract had been frustrated.
(a) Should Wijsmuller's defence of frustration succeed?
(b) If Wijsmuller knew on February 16, 1981, that its defence of frustration might not succeed,
what might it have chosen.,to do?
(c) What if the Super Servant Two had sunk because of Wijsmuller' s negligence?
2. A, a peach grower in the Okanagan Valley, has agreed to sell 100 kilograms of peaches
from A's orchard to each of five customers. A severe hailstorm damages the orchard with the result
that only 100 kilograms of peaches in total are produced. What should A do? See Hollinger Consol
Gold Mines Ltd. v. Northern Can. Power, (1923) 4 D.L.R. 1205 (Ont. C.A.); Samuel v. Black lake
Asbestos & Chrome Co. (1920), 58 D.L.R. 270, _reversed on other grounds 62 S.C.R. 472. What
if A's contract with each customer contained a force majeure clause, which absolved A of liability
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for failure to deliver in these circumstances? See J. Lauritzen A.S. v. Wijsmuller B. V., ( 1989) I Lloyd' s
Rep. 148 at 158-59.
3. A agrees to purchase a condominium in a building yet to be constructed by the vendor/qeveloper.
The developer then gets into a "war" with the planning authority which ultimately refuses the building
pennit and down zones the site. Is the contract frustrated? See Dinicola v. Huang & Danc;,kay Properties
( 1996), 135 D.L.R. (4th) 525 (Ont. Gen. Div.), affirmed on other grounds (1998), 163 D.L.R. (4th)
286 (Ont. C.A.).

4. Frustration and Contracts Conveying an Interest in Land
There has always been considerable controversy in the common law world
as to whether contracts conveying an interest in land, and particularly leases,
could be frustrated. For a long time there was little Canadian authority on point,
but most cases indicated, obiter, that Canadian courts would follow the lower
English courts and hold that the doctrine did not apply to leases. The following
Ontario case contains the first serious discussion of this point by a senior Canadian
court.
CAPITAL QUALIT Y HOMES LTD. v. COLWYN CONS TRUCTION LTD.
(1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 617, 61 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (C.A.)

The facts of the case are set out supra, at p. 678. .
EVANS J.A . .. . The ·controversial question that is still undecided by the
House of Lords is whether the doctrine of frustration can be applied to a lease
of land. Cases involving the destruction of a chattel, the subject of the contract,
as in Howell v. Coupland (1876), l Q.B.D. 258 (C.A.), or the destruction -of a
music hall, the existence of which was the foundation of the contract, as in Taylor
v. Caldwell, [supra], or those cases in which the performance of the contract
has become illegal because of some supervening legislation are to be distinguished
from land leases which are considered to be more than contracts, since they create
estates in land which give rise_ to proprietary rights in addition to purely personal
rights _as found in all commercial contracts. In the development of the modem
law of contracts an increasingly wider conception of the doctrine of frustration
as a ground of discharge of commercial contracts came into operation but the
Engli sh Courts have consistently held that the doctrine of frustration has no appli
cation when the contract creates an estate in land.
In Cricklewood Properties & lnvt. Ltd. v. Leighton 's lnvt. Trust Ltd., [1945]
A.C.. 221 (H.L.), Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Goddard held to the view
that the doctrine of frustration cannot apply to a demise of real property. Viscount
Simon, L.C., and Lord Wright . took the position that the doctrine is modem and
flexible and ought not to be restricted by an arbitrary formula. Lord Porter expressed
no opinion on the question. . . .
. In Cricklewood, supra, the trial Judge ·would have held the contract to be
discharged, had he not been convinced that there was clear authority that the
doctrine of frustration could not be applied to a demise of real property. The
Court of Appeal affirmed his judgment on the ground that frustration was not
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applicable. It was only when the case was considered in the House of Lords
that some doubt was cast upon the earlier cases which had come to be regarded
as authoritative. Viscount Simon L.C. defined "frustration" as [at p. 228]:
. . . the premature determination of an agreement between parties, lawfully entered into and
in course of operation at the time of its premature determination, owing to the occurrence of
an intervening event. or change of circumstances so fundamental as to be regarded by the Jaw
both as striking at the root of the agreement, and as entirely beyond what was contemplated
by the parties when they entered into the agreement.

He was of the opinion that the doctrine could apply to a lease of land although
he considered that the instances in which it could be successfully invoked were
very rare. He stated tha� the Court of Appeal was in error in concluding that
the authorities held that a lease cannot in any circumstances be ended by frustration.

. . . Lord Wright agreed with Lord Simon and pointed out that the doctrine
of frustration is not subject to being constricted by an arbitrary formula. .. .
In Cricklewood, Viscount Simon L.C., and Lord Wright held against the
accepted view that leases were outside the doctrine since a lease in addition to
being a contract creates an estate in the land demised for the period of the agreed
term. I adopt the reasoning of Viscount Simon L.C., and his conclusion that there
is no binding autherity precluding the application of the .doctrine of frustration
to contracts involving the lease of lands. I am also in accord with his observations
that the doctrine is flexible and ought not to be restricted by any arbitrary formula.
I see no reason why the doctrine cannot be logically extended to contracts involving
the purchase and sale of land. If the supervening event makes the contract incapable
of fulfilment as contemplated by the parties, then it appears to me illogical and
unreasonable to contend that the fundamental object of the contract can be effected
because the equitable interest in the land has passed to the purchaser.
I adopt the reasoning of Lord Simon in Cricklewood, supra, and accept his
conclusion that there is no binding authority in England precluding the application
of the doctrine of frustration to contracts involving a lease of land. I believe
the situation to be the same in Ontario and I am unable to distinguish any difference
between leases of land and agreements for the sale of land, so far as the application
of the doctrine is concerned. Each is more than a simple contract. In the former
an estate in land is created while in the latter an equitable estate arises. There
does not appear to be any logical reason or binding legal .authority which · would
prohibit the extension of the doctrine to contracts involving land.
NOTE and QUESTION ..
l . Do the reasons that favour the application of the doctrine of frustration to a lease necessarily
support its application to sales of land? See Waddams, The !Aw of Contracts, 3rd ed. (1993), at
248-50.
2. The House of Lords resolved the divisi�n of opinion in the Cricklewood case by deciding
in Nat. Carriers v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd., (1981 ) A.C. 675, that in principle a lease could be
frustrated. See also, Turner v. Clark (1983), 30 R.P.R. 164 (N.B. C.A.).

:
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5. Should the Doctrine of Frustration be Expanded: Commercial
Impracticality and Social Force Majeure?
It is apparent that the courts have been reluctant to expand the doctrine of
frustration because of the threat that it poses for the shibboleth of sanctity of
contract. Anglo-Canadian courts have reiterated on many occasions that even a
dramatic increase in expense or the fact that performance has become significantly
more onerous will not suffice. Bad bargains are not enough . But there are several
hints that the doctrine could be expanded.
First, there are long term supply contracts, a phenomenon that has become
increasingly common in the twentieth century. In these situations parties may
bind themselves to provide goods and/or services (water, fuel or electricity) for
many decades. Obviously, such contracts are vulnerable to the possibility that
some unanticipated exogenous events (for example, hyperinflation, transformation
in the marketplace by the emergence of a price-inflating cartel, or enviromilental
protection legislation) could thwart (at least olie of the parties' expectations). With
the �xception of Lord Denning (Staffordshire Area Health Authority v. South Staf- .
fordshire Waterworks Co., [1978] 3 All E.R. 769 (C.A.)), English and Canadian
courts have been unsympathetic to such arguments. (For a critique of this absolute
prohibition, on the basis of both policy and principle, see Beatson, "Increased
Expense and Frustration" in Rose, ed., Consensus ad Idem: Essays in the uiw
of Contract in Honour of Guenter Treitel (1996) 121.)
However, in several other jurisdictions there has been greater openn�ss to
the possibility of excusing performance on the basis of extreme economic hardship.
McBryde, in "Frustration of Contract" (1980), 25· Juridical Rev. (N.S. ) l at 11
draws our attention to an old Scottish case, _Wilkie v. Bethune (1848), 11 D. 132
where
[a]n employer was bound to pay his servant in potatoes. There was a dramatic rise in
the price of potatoes due to the fail�e of the crop in 1846. If the servant had been paid in
potatoes he would have greatly benefitted. However, the court applied an equitable construction
to the contract and held the servant entitled, not to· his potatoes, but to a sum which would
purchase the equivalent of other food.

In the United States there is the d�trine of "commercial impracticality". U.C .C.
Section 2-615 and the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
2nd ed. (1979) 261 both provide that the obligation to perform is excused if "perfor
mance as agreed has been made impractic� by the occurrence of a contingency
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made." See for example Mineral Park uind Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156
P. 458 (1916); Aluminum Co. of Anierica (Alcoa) v. Essex Group Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53 (W.D. Pa. , 1980); Florida Power :a,nd Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Co,. ,
826 F.2d 239 (1987). Another example is to be found in Codelfa Construction
Pty. Ltd. v. State Rail Authority of Nsw· (1982), 149 C.L.R. 337, where the Australian
High Court found that, 'despite the long list of precedent to the contrary, extreme
financial hardship for a builder could ground frustration.
In the light of these cases reconsider Capital Quality Homes. Is it truly a
situation of impossibility, or is it more accurately an example of coinrnercial impract-
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f icality? (See Fridman, "The Theory and Practice of Frustration" (1977), 26(2)
Chitty's L.J. 37 at 42.)
Commercial impracticality primarily relates to supervening events that affect
the relations between two corporations. In some jurisdictions there is a cognate
doctrine for consumers who experience a significant change in their financial
circumstances that renders their contractual obligations for leases, credit cards
or loans significantly more onerous. This is sometimes called social force majeure.
Wilhelmsson provides the following introduction to the concept as it has emerged
in Scandinavia:
WILHELMSSON, "'SOCIAL FORCE MAJEUlIB'
A NEW CONCEPT IN NORDIC CONSUMER LAW''
(1990), 13 Journal of Consumer Policy l , at 7-8

The principle of social force majeure could be applied when the following
four conditions are fulfilled:
1. The consumer is affected by some special occurrence such as an unfavour
able change in his health (physical or mental illness, personal injury), work
(unemployment, reduced work, strike and lockout), housing (tennination of lease)
or family (divorce, death _or injury of family member). The list is not exhaustive;
other occurrences may be relevant, too.
2. There is a causal, connection between this occurrence and the consumer's
difficulties in paying. If the· occurrence has not led to economic difficulties for
the person concerned - if he is wealthy and has other resources - he may
not invoke the principle ofsocial force majeure.
3. If the consumer foresaw the special occurrence when he concluded the
contract, he cannot rely on it.
4. If the occurrence was caused by the fault of the consumer, he is also
prevented from invoking the principle of social force majeure.
There are various legal consequences which may be attached to social force
majeure. ...
• Many of the �cts, such as the legislation on interest, prescribe that social
force should lead to a mitigation of the sanctions imposed on a consumer
who has not been able to pay on time. It therefore seems quite natural that
social force majeure should form a relevant defence against, e.g., the liability
to pay damages in case ofdelay.
• In some cases, when avoidance of a contract would cause economic losses
..,
to the consumer, social .force majeure should prevent the other party from
avoiding the· contract, at least for some time. Such a consequence would
be especially important in the case of permanent contracts concerning necessary
utilities like electricity, telephone, and heating.
• In some cases . . . one might recognize the right of the consumer to withdraw
from a binding contract or to terminate a long term contrac.t when he is
hit by social force majeure.

690

FRUSTRATION

I

· CH.10

QUESTION
ls the following provision of the Residential Tenancies Act, R.S.N.S., c. 401 an example of social
force majeure in the Canadian context?
Early tennination upon income reduction

10B Notwithstanding Section 10, where the income of a tenant, or one of a group of
the ten�ts in the same residential premises, is so reduced because of a significant deterioration
of a tenant's health that it is not reasonably sufficient to pay the rent in addition to the tenant's
other reasonable expenses, or if there is more than one tenant, the tenant may terminate a
year-to-year tenancy by giving the landlord
(1) one month's notice to quit; and
(2) a certificate of a medical practitioner evidencing the significant deterioration of health.
In light of the ideas of commercial impracticality and social /
orce majeure consider the following
discussion of the context and impact of the recession of 1981-1983.

CONKLIN, A CONTRACT
in Devlin, ed., Canadian Perspectives on Legal T heory
(Toronto: Grand Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1991)� pp. 213-215
[The author had discussed. language as a system of signs, which in the case
of law mediates the lawyer's interpretation of facts with the consequences of
separating the law from soc_ial practices which the sign system does not incorporate.]
The possibility that there -might be victims beyond or outside of. the· legal sign
system is difficult for Can�ian lawyers to fathom because they nave been so
successfully assimilated into ·a language that precludes that possibility. First, the
sign system induces the belief that a contract is a private matter in that it regulates
the private relationships between two parties in contrast to the public matters
that concern the state. So,· the lawyer demarcates the contract as falling within
private law as opposed to public law. Second, the legal sign system reinforces
the belief that financial institutions are independent of the state. . . . This belief
is strong µotwithstanding the fact that ,the state formally creates and regulates
financial institutions and notwithstanding the fact that the Minister of Finance
is theoretically responsible for monetary policy in Canada. Being considered private
institutions independent of .the government, we tend to contrast the banker to
the police officer. We tend to believe that raw physical. force is associated with
the criminal code and not with the contr�ct. Third, the sign system of which
th� contract is only a part induces the belief that, in contrast to prisoners, business
persons retain their liberty to live freely from physical restraint within society.
This freedom from physical coercion is called civil liberty. We are also led to
- believe that, notwithstanding the enforcement of the contract, borrowers retain
their liberty to express themsefves, to vote, to travel interprovincially, to assemble
in a group, and to associate with others without constraint from the state. The
sign system calls this political liberty. The sign system of law, then, induces us
to believe that the contract is the epitome of freedom in that it is a private matter
involving a private dispute 1ndependent of the state. With the help of the sign
system in the subject area of constitutional law, we are led to believe that freedom
is still retained during the enforcement of the contract.
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The recession of 1 981-83 in Southwestern Ontario suggests that such beliefs
are illusory. When one looks beyond the legal system to empirically oriented
studies of the financial industry, to the testimony before legislative committees,
to the interviews and statistical studies of the financial industry c�ed out by
f; respected
journalists, to studies in banking and business journals, and · to other
nonlegal resource material, one is struck by the publi c issues that envelop the
act. Moreover, one is struck by how the sign system of lawyers misdescribes
f contr
� and even c.onceals the suffering as practised in Canada.
And yet, the lawyer's sign system concentrated upon the contract as the source
of a dispute during the recession of 1 981-83. That contract involved two "indepen
dent" parties, alone isolated from other human beings, scissored from the indigenous
community of fellow fanners and businesspersons, and estranged from the indige
nous community at large. The sign system constructed the, parties as two atomistic
individuals at civil war.
The sign system of the lawyer at the time presupposed, for example, that
if individuals were granted fair opportunities to fulfill their duties, they should
be able to do so. So, if they could not obtain alternate financing within a few
hours or days, then they des�rved to have their assets seized. The outcome was
deemed a just one. But the public record drawn from outside the lawyer's sign
system seems to suggest that the factors triggering many loan calls during the
1981,.83 recession were·extemal to the debtor's competence, foreseeability, blame
worthiness, and control. The most important factor during the period, for example,
was the extraordinarily rapid rise
. in inte_rest. rates beginning in late 1 979. The
interest rate charged to the preferred customers of �e chartered banks climbed
from 12.75 percent on February 28, · 1 979, to 23.5 percent in August 1981 where
it remained until September 1 1, 1 981. Trust companies and credit unions, to the
extent that they financed small businesses and farms at the time, charged still
higher rates. By 1 984, the financial institutions had lowered their interest rates
to their former level. Fanners and small businesspersons could not have foreseen
the rapid and radical escalation of the interest rate. Nor could they have controlled
it, notwithstanding the fact that most contracts allowed for a floating interest rate,
which the debtor theoretically could have renegotiated into a fixed rate (at a possibly
still higher level). Further, regionally declining employment and markets also lay
outside the borrower's control. Not infrequently, the very circumsta,nces that brought
on the enforcement of one person's contract reverberated throughout the regional
economy as a whole. In one industry towns, the enforcement of the dominant
company's contract undennined the whole community's self-confidence. This, in
turn, affected the lender•� �xpectations about the future economy of a region or
industry. And this, in turn, affected how lenders would consider the financial position
of other farmers and small businesspersons. . . .
Let us take one more example of how the focus upon the contract lopped
off a great deal of social practice. A focus upon the contract encouraged the
lawyer to consider how the lender could be placed in the status quo ante that is, how could the situation be corrected so as tQ repair the particular economic
loss caused to . the lender by the borrower's failure to pay upon demand? This
question, in turn, carried with it an isolated time sequence of the two individual

f·
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parties leading up to the enforcement of the contract. It lopped off the social
and economic conditions leading up to tl_ie borrower's decision to take out a loan
during the 1970s. At that time, financial institutions and government agencies
were rapidly expanding credit. As Donald Fullerton, the President of the CIBC,
once acknowledged, this expanding credit constituted "the mistakes of the '70s":
"What were we thinking of when we made the loans?" The Central Mortgage
and Housing Corporation influenced expectations through loans at below-market
interest rates; capital contributions to low income housing and rental construction;
loans and grants to municipalities for land assembly, sewage, and water projects;
and sµbsidies for home insulation. Similarly, by March 1979, the Farm Credit
Corporation had granted 71,722 outstanding loans totalling 2.7 billion dollars for
the purchase of farm_ equipment, livestock, buildings, and land. And the Export
Development Corporation had extended commercial credit for exports and for
the creation of large capital projects in Canada by foreign companies. By the
end of the 1 970s, these four government agencies had flushed 8. 7 billion dollars
into businesses in Canada. And this was all in addition to the great expansion
of loans py fmancial institutions. Unlimited optimism in a crassly materialistic
culture permeated the decisions of farmers and small businesspersons to take out
loans. But the contract was read into a preexisting sign system that excluded
all these factors from its scope.
For lawyers, the sign syst_em induced them to interpret_ the circumstances
as isolated disputes between two socially atomistic and isolated parti�s. The sign
system projected the judge's role as one of adjudicating that dispute. By focusing
-Upon the contract as the source of - all relevant rights and duties, the sign system
estranged the two atomistic parties. from any connection with other human beings.
The sign system just could not allow lawyers to ask whether borrowers' defaults
were caused by economic factors outside of their control; whether the financing
of small business in Canada allowed for a competition among commercial lenders
at the time; whether there was even a semblance of bargaining power between
the two "self-sufficient" parties when the lender drew up the initial draft of the
contract; whether financial institutions did in fact draw up the contract and, if
so, how frequently did borrowers attempt or succeed in amending lenders' drafts;
whether particular lenders controlled a relatively large proportion of all borrowing
funds in the Canadian economy; whether lenders possessed an expansive and diversi
fied asset basis; whether they effectively lobl;>ied for regulatory protection
throughout the 1970s; whether they advised the central bankers of monetary and
interest rate policy; and whether they had effectively acted as partners with the
farmers and small businesspersons g·enerally since the nineteenth century. The
sign system in which lawyers found tl:iemselves. prevented them from considering
such issues as legally relevant to th� ,tacts and circumstances of cases. The door
to the social world could hardly budge. Its hinges were seized. No light could
be detected beyond a lawyer's gaze. And this occurred despite the sign system'�
professed appeal to the facts and circumstances of each case.
[Footnotes omitted.]
I
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6. Anticipating the Unforeseeable: Force Majeure Clauses

r

While it is true that one may not be able to anticipate the specific impact
of unforeseen contingencies, many business people recognize that given the nature
of their business there may be some general contingencies beyond their control
that might make performance either impossible or more onerous than they expect
To facilitate forward planning and provide for flexibility, many contracts include
force majeure clauses. Generally speaking, such clauses can provide a variety
of options: first, perform.a.nee can be suspended for a specified period of time;
secondly, the contract might be varied; and third, if necessary, there may be an
option to terminat� the contract without having to pay damages for non-performance.
Clearly, force majeure clauses are an attempt to allocate risk in the event that
an exogenous contingency arises .
Because such clauses · are designed to avoid the doctrine of absolute contracts
and excuse performance, thereby transferring all risk of loss onto the other party,
the courts tend to worry that there might be an inequitable allocation of risk.
Consequently, courts are inclined to construe such clauses quite strictly although
there is no rule of law to this effect.

ATLANTIC PAPER STOCK LTD. v.
ST. ANNE-NACKAWIC PULP & PAPER CO.

[1 976] I S.C.R. 580, iO N.B.R. (2d) 5 13, 56 D.L.R. (3d) 409, 4 N.R. 539

DICKSON J. [delivering the judgment of the court] This litigation arises out
of a contract for the sale by Atlantic Paper Stock Limited and Elliot Krever &
Associates (Maritimes) Ltd. to St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp and Paper Company, Ltd.
of 10,000 tons of waste paper a year for 10 years, to be used as secondary fibre
in the manufacture of corrugating_ medium at St. Anne's mill. After 14 months,
St Anne advised Atlantic and Elliot Krever it would not accept any more secondary
fibre and the latter sued for damages. In. defence, St. Anne pleaded non-availability
of markets for pulp or corrugating medium with the meaning of the concluding
words of cl. 2(a) of the contract, reading:
St. Anne warrants and represents that its requirements under this contract shall be approxi
mately 15,000 tons a year. and further warrants that in any one year its requirements for Secondary
Fibre shall not be less than 10,000 tons, unless as a result of an act of God, the Queen's
or public enemies, war, the authority of the law, labour unrest, or strikes, the destruction of
or damages to production facilities, or the non-availability of markets for pulp or corrugating
medium

. . . Quantum of damages _aside, the sole question is whether non-availability
of markets for pulp or corrugated medium discharged St. Anne from its obligations
under the contract.
St. Anne owns and operates a mill at Nackawic, New Brunswick, which
was designed to manufacture pulp and paper. St. Anne is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Parsons & Whittemore, an American company with world-wide interests in
the pulp and paper industry. Construction of the mill was started in 1 968, and
completed in 1 970, at a cost of $72,000,000, of which $1 8,000,000 was invested
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in the section designed for the manufacture of paper. The mill began to manufacture
paper in April of 1970, and bleached hardwood Kraft pulp in June of 1970. The
paper manufactured was a semi-chemical medium commonly referred to as corru.
gating medium, which is used in the packaging and box industry. Corrugating
medium is placed between two sheets of what is known as liner board, a product
not produced by St. Anne, to form the stuff of which cardboard cartons are made.
The raw materials required to produce the type of corrugating mediuin manufactured
by St. Anne included 15% so-called secondary fibre, which is waste paper salvaged
from used corrugated cartons and shipping cases.
The contract in issue in these proceedings is dated April 10, 1970, and obligates
St. Anne to purchase, on stated terms, exclusively from or through Atlantic and
Elliot Krever, all its requirements, maximal 18,000 tons and minimal 10,000 tons,
of secondary fibre for its mill. Following upon the execution of this contract,
Atlantic and Elliot Krever entered into agreements with the City of St. John and
with two New Brunswick breweries for the provision of the
. secondary fibre needed
under the contract with St. Anne. Atlantic and Elliot Krever furnished St. Anne
with secondary fibre in accordance with the terms of the contract until they received,
without warning, advice by telegram on June 9, 1971, that St. Anne would _not
accept any more fibre. The paper machine closed down on June 16, 1971, and
has since stood idle.
An act of God clause or force majeure clause, and it is within such a clause
that the words "non-availability of markets" are found, generally operates to
discharge a contracting party when a supervening, sometimes supernatural, event,
beyond control of either party, makes performance impossible. The common thread
is that of the unexpected, so,pething beyond reasonable human foresight and skill.
ff markets were unavailable to St.Anne, did they become so because of something
unexpected happening after April 10, 1970? Was the change so radical as to strike
at the root of the contract? Could the company, through the exercise of reasonable
skill, have found markets in which to trade? Clause 2(a) contemplates the following
frustrating events: an act of God, the Queen's.or public enemies, war, the authority
of the law, labour unrest or strikes, the destruction of or damage to production
facilities. Reading the clause ejusdem generis, it seems to me that "non-availability
of markets" as a discharging condition must be limited to an event over which
the respondent exercises no control. . ..
[Dickson J. then commented that the primary cause of the failure of St. Anne's
corrugating medium facility was a lack of an ·effective marketing plan for the
product.] St. Anne's had known prior to the present contract that the U.S. market
was foreclosed to it. It then appeared that St. Anne's had greatly overestimated
its ability to sell in the Canadian market, which was dominated by integrated
companies, with parent companies nianufacturing corrugating medium and selling
to subsidiaries manufacturing cardboard cartons. In addition in 1970 and 1971,
a number of technological and competitive factors caused a decline of perhaps
10% in the export potential to European markets. The trial Judge summed up
St. Anne's marketing problems as follows:
Feasibility studies had been done for the defendant, prior to construction and the reports
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were optimistic. Needless to say, the predictions on all points have been incorrect so far. The
situation at the time of cancellation of the contract herein was substantially the same as at
the time of the studies.

The difference between the conclusion of the trial Judge and that of the
Appeal Division turned essentially on whether the words "non-availability of
markets" meant non-availability of economic markets for St. Anne. Mr. Justice
Barry found no such connotation in the language of the clause. The effect- of
the Appeal Division opinion would be to relieve St. Anne of contractual obligati!)n
if St. Anne could not operate at a profit I doubt that reasonable men would have
made such a bargain. It would in my opinion be doing violence to the plain
words "non-availability of markets for pulp or corrugating medium" in the context
of the entire clause within which the words are found, to pennit St. Anne to.
rely upon its soaring production costs to absolve it of contractual liability. .. .
[On the -basis of a market survey it] would appear, therefore, that on an
average selling price per ton of $120 St Anne would lose $30.29 per ton in June,
1970, and $66.94 per ton in June, 1971. In the first year of operation St. Anne's
mill operated at a loss of $9,000,000 as against a projected loss of $782,000.
As Mr. Justice Barry said, "the defendant simply priced itself out of any available
market existing".
- Th e trial Judge made [the following critical finding of fact]:
. .. the conditions existi�g in the market on April 10, 1970, when the parties executed p. I
were and are substantially the same as at the time of cancellation in June, 1971, and at present.

Exhibit P-1 is the contract to which I have referred. He also held:

I find that there is a market for corrugated medium. albeit a declining one, and very competi
tive marlcet, and certainly, not an economic market at the defendant's cost per ton.

Mi. Wiltshire, senior vice-president of St. Anne, was asked by counsel to
state the factors on which the decision to stop production were based. He prefaced
his answer by the words: "It was an accumulation of circumstances", and then
referred to a change of agents in Germany, failure to get repeat business, competition
from bogus medium, unsold inventory of more than half of production, re-evaluation
, of the Canadian dollar. The factors confirm beyond doubt the presence of many
serious marketing difficul�es, but, in my opinion, they do not establish, in the
face of evidence of a strong demand for corrugated medium throughout the world
! and of competitors of St. Anne selling to the limit of their respective productive
capacities, that markets for corrugating medium were not available to St. Anne.
I do not think St. Anne can rely on a condition which it brought upon itself.
A fair reading of the evide�ce leads one to conclude that the whole St. Anne
project for the manufacture of corrugating medium was misconceived. The problems
which plagued it proceeded,:.:however, not from non-availability of markets for
corrugating medium but from (i) lack of an effective marketing plan, as I have
stated; St . Anne spent $16,000,000 to produce a product without any notion of
where the product would be sold, and (ii) inordinate operating costs, aggravated
by two subsidiary factors: (a) lack of captive outlets, and (b) failure to produce
liner board; customers needed both corrugating medium and liner board, and
preferred manufacturers who could offer both. The project, conceived in ephemeral
'
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.hopes and not the harsh realities of the market place, resulted in failure for which
St. Anne and not changes in the market for corrugating medium during the period
April 10, 1970 to June 9, 1971 must be held accountable.
[Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and St. Anne was held liable for damages
in the amount of $108,250.]

NOTES AND QUESTIONS

This

1.
case emphasizes the restrictive approach of courts in interpreting clauses that are drafted
in an attempt to guard against unexpected events. For a discussion of Canadian cases, which generally
exhibit this approach, see Comment ( 1976), 54 Can. Bar Rev. 161.
Why do courts tend to construe force majeure clauses strictly? The restrictive approach to the
interpretation of such clauses seems to be continued in Atcor Ltd. v. Continental Energy Marketing
Ltd. (1996), 38 Alta. L.R. (3d) 229 (C.A.).
Atcor and Continental entered into· a contract whereby Atcor would supply Continental with
natural gas by means of a pipeline operated by a third party, Nova Corporation. The contract
· contained
·
the followingforce majeure clause:
9. Subject to the other provisions of this paragraph, if either party to this Agreement fails
to observe or perform any of the covenants or obligations herein imposed upon it and such
failure shall have been occasioned by, or in consequence of force majeure, as hereinafter defined,
such failure shall be deemed not to be a breach of such covenants or obligations.
(a) For the purposes of this Agreement. the term "force majeure" shall mean any acts of God,
including therein, but without restricting the generality thereof, lightning, earthquakes and storms
and in addition shall mean any strikes, lockouts or other industrial disturbances, acts of the
Queen's enemies, sabotage, wars, blockades, insurrections, riots, epidemics, landslides, floods,
fires, washouts, arrests and restraints, civil disturbances, explosions, breakages of or accidents
to plant, machinery or lines of pipe, hydrate obstructions ·of lines of pipe, freezings of wells
or delivery facilities, .well blowouts, cratering, pipeline tie-ins, pipeline connections, pipeline
repairs and reconditioning, the orders of any court or governmental authority, the invoking
of force majeure pursuant to any gas purchase contracts, any acts or omissions (including failure
to take gas) of a transporter of gas to or for Seller which is excused by any event or occurrence
of the character hc�in defined as constituting force majeure, or any other causes, wbcdler of
the kind hcicin enumerated or otherwise� not within the control of the party claiming suspension
and which, by the exercise of due diligence, such party is unable to overcome.
Thus the clause explicitly provided that problems with the pipeline would constitute force majeure,
and further provided that a party could noi have the benefit of the force majeure clause if the force
majeure event were within its power or could be overcome by due diligence.
During the course of the contract numerous pipeline problems forced Nova to decrease the amount
of natural gas that Atcor was allowed to transport .via the pipeline. Atcor drastically reduced its shipments
to Continental, declaringforce majeure, but continued to supply other customers via the Nova pipeline.
At trial, the court ruled that Nova• s reduction of service to Atcor constituted force majeure
under the agreement between Atcor and Continental and that the reduction was not within Atcor's
power and could not be remedied by due diligence. Continental appealed, arguing that the pipeline
restrictions did not cause Atcor's drastic reductions in supply; rather, they argued that Atcor's decision
to direct what natural gas it could ship to other customers was the reason for the curtailment of
service. The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed Continental's appeal, ruling that the trial judge erred
in focusing only on the force maje�re event .and not on the effects of that event. Although the pipeline
restrictions were not themselves' within Atcor's power, the court ruled that Atcor was obliged to
demonstrate that it could not mitigate the effects of the reductions by other means, provided those
means were concordant with reasonable industry practice. The Court of Appeal remitted the case
for a new trial, since the trial judge had not considered the largely factual question of whether Atcor
could have mitigated the effects of the pipeline restrictions while remaining within the bounds of
reasonable business standards.

:
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2. For comprehensive reviews of the law in relation to force majeure see Treitel, Frustration
and Force Majeure ( 1994) and McKendrick. ed., Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract (1991).
,

3. Does the judicial approach to force majeure clauses shed any light on the more general question
to
as the role of the judiciary in developing the common law of frustration?

7. Effect of Frustration

The effect of frustration is to automatically terminate the contract as of the
moment of frustration, regardless of the wishes of the parties. 1\vo points _should
be noted. First, unlike mistake, frustration is not retrospective, it does not render
the contract void ab initio; rather parties are released from further obligations.
Second, unlike a s_erious breach where the innocent party can choose whether
to treat the contract as repudiated or not, frustration does not allow for a power
of election. Both parties are automatically discharged from future performance
of obligations. However, rights and obligations accrued prior to the frustration
remain enforceable. This rule leads to some unfortunate financial consequences
and has resulted in legislative intervention in every province _but Nova Scotia.
The following extract outlines a) the common law position; b) two different legisla
tive regimes.
ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON AMENDMENT
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT
(i)

The Common Law Position

(1987), pp. 279-82

Three principal issues arise in considering what relief should be made available
following the frustration of a contract The first is whether compensation should
be allowed for benefits conferred on a party prior to frustration even though the
contract does not provide for it and, where the benefit consists of non-pecuniary
performance, performance is only partial. The second issue is whether reliance
expenditures· incurred by the parties in performance of their obligations should
be recoverable and to what extent. The third issue is whether a court should
be free to examine the surrounding circumstances to determine whether it is appro
priate to allocate the reliance losses on some other basis than would otherwise
be �ppropriate because of the implied agreement of the parties, trade usages, or
general economic considerations.
The common law answers to these questio� are both rigid and unsatisfactory.
Briefly, the general position at common law regarding compensation for benefits
conferred may be considered under two heads: recovery of monies paid and recom
pense for non-pecuniary: benefits conferred. Turning first to recovery of monies
paid, the 1904 case of Chandler v. Webster [[1904] 1 K.B. 493] held that money
paid under a frustrated ·contract could not be recovered on the theory that the
action for money had and received would not lie unless the contract was void
ab initio. A frustrated contract was avoided, it was thought, only from the occurrence
of the· frustrating event. Moreover, obligations accrued before the frustrating event
would remain enforceable on the same theory.
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The decision of the House of Lords in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn
Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd. [[1943] A.C. 32] overruled Chandler and discredited
the theory underlying it. In Fibrosa, a buyer who had made partial payment before
the frustrating event sought recovery. The House· of Lords recognized the buyer's
right to recover money paid, provided that the seller's consideration wholly failed.
[Viscount Simon stated, at 46-47:
To claim the return of money paid on the ground of total failure of consideration is not to
vary the tenns of the contract in any way. The claim arises not because the right to be repaid
is one of the stipulated conditions of the contract, but because, in the circumstances that have
happened, the law gives the remedy. . . . [l]t does not follow that because the plaintiff cannot
sue "on the contract" he cannot sue dehors [ie outsideJ the contract' for the recovery of a payment
in respect of which consideration has failed.

However, he continued, at 49:
While this result [the return of money paid] obviates the harshness with which the previous
view in some instances treated the party who had made a prepayment, it cannot be regarded
as dealing fairly between the parties in all cases and must sometimes have the result of leaving
the recipient who has to return the money at a grave disadvantage. He may have incurred
expenses in connexion with the partial carrying out of the contract which are equivalent. or
more than equivalent, to the money which he prudently stipulated should be prepaid but which
be now has to return for reasons. which are no fault of bis. He may have to repay the money,
though he has executed almost the whole of the contractual work, which will be left on bis
hands. These results follow from the fact that the English common law does not undertake
to apportion a prepaid sum in such circumstances. ... ")

In the absence of total failure.�f consideration, however, it would seem that restitutionary relief would be denied. ·
. As to recompense for non-pecuniary benefits conferred, in England, recovery
for the value of partial performance is ·made difficult by the rule in Appleby v. Myers,
((1867), L.R. 2 C.P. 65 1 (Ex.)]. This case held that, in the case of non-pecuniary
benefits conferred under a contract that has been frustrated, recovery is not available
for partial performance of an entire con�ct: the performing party must perform
fully to earn his or her payment.
In Canada, the position ·of a party who has partly performed should be more
promising in the light of the Supreme Court of Canada's embrace of a general
doctrine of unjust enrichment in Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada, [supra�
Chapter 4, section 8(c)(iii)]. However, the Deglman doctrine only applies (assuming
it is applied to frustration cases) to restif:utionary claims for benefits conferred.
Neither Canadian nor English law offers indemnification to a party who has incurred
reliance expenditures in prep_aration for,. or partial performance of, contractual
obligations not resulting in. f:?enefits conferred on the other party. The loss lies
. where it falls. Given this· rut�·•. the common law courts obviously do not have
to concern themselves with )iny implied agreement between the parties for the
allocation of reliance expenditures. The common law rule on the non-recoverability
of reliance expenditures is defensible on policy grounds, but it may lead to anoma
lies. It means, for example, that a party who has prepaid all or part of the price
but received no return benefits is entitled to recover his payments in full, while
the other party who may have spent as much or more in part performance of
his obligations is entitled to nothing.
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(ii) Legislative Developments
.. ·. The principal features of the [Act that applies in Ontario, and the majority
of the common law provinces] are these. The Act abolishes the rule in Chandler
v. Webster by relieving a contracting party from liability to make payments accruing
before the date of frustration, but without affecting any claim against him or
her for damages, and allows recovery of any payments made before· this time.
So far as non-pecuniary benefits are concerned, the court may, not must, allow
recovery of their value. The recovery of reliance expenditures is still more circums
cribed. ... [T]he Act provides that the court may permit the party incurring such
expenses to retain so much of any payments received from the other party as
is necessary to indemnify him or her for such expenses or to recover them from
the other party if monies were payable to the other party before the date of frustra
tion. These limited rights of recovery for reliance expenditures appear to have
been animated by the theory that prepayment of the price is intended to protect
the other party's reliance interests. The theory has little to commend it and has
justly been criticized.
Finally, certain exclusions in the Ontario Act that follow those in the British
Act should be noted. The Ontario Act does not apply to maritime contracts, insurance
contracts, or to a contract. for the sale of specific goods. ...
In 1974 British Columbia enacted a new Frustrated Contract Act [R.S.B.C:
1996, c. 166]. The Act was also adopted at the same time by the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada as a new Uniform Frustrated Contracts Act. The British
Columbia Act ("the -Act") was based o_n the recommendations in a Report of
the British Columbia· Law Reform Commission and was designed to remove the
shortcomings in the first Uniform Act. It was largely successful in this objective
although, in our vie:W, a number of further improvements are desirable.
The Act introduces three important changes. First, it removes a discretionary
element in the first Uniform Act in allowing, as of right, the recovery of compensa
tion for non-pecuniary benefits conferred before discharge of the contract. Second,
it ·provides that relian�e losses shall be divided equally between the parties without
regard to any prepayments that may have been made under the contract. Third,
it recognizes explicitly that the parties may have intended to allocate the risk
of loss of reliance · expenditures on a basis different from that provided for in
the Act, and establishes criteria for determining whether they have done so in fact.
[Footnotes partially omitted.]

NOTES and QUESTIONS
I . The O.L.R.C. recom.uiended adoption of a modified version of the B.C. legislation. See Report
on Amendment ofthe Law ofContract (1987), at 285.
2. For a critique of the· approach taken under the Frustrated Contracts Acts and the British Columbia
legislation and a consideratim� of alternative models that have been adopted in New South Wales
and Victoria, see Stewart and Carter, "Frustrated Contracts and Statutory Adjustment: The Case for
Reappraisal" (1992), 5 1 Camb. L.J. 66. For a discussion of some more imaginative approaches to
loss sharing see Trakrnan, "Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial Impracticability" (1985),
69 Minn. L. Rev. 471.
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3. Citations of other versions of the Frustrated Contracts Act are: R.S.A. 19,80. c. F-20; C.C.S.M.•
c. Fl90; R.S.N.B. 1973, c. F-24; R.S.N. 1990. c. F-26; R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. F-12; R.S.O. 1990. c. F.34
as amended S.O. 1993, c. 27, Schd.; R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. F-16, S.S. 1994, c. F-22.2, R.S.Y. 1986.
c. 73. R.S.Y. 1986, C. 73; S.S. 1994, C. F-22.2.
Sections ll and V of the Civil Code of Quebec respectively provide for an ..exception from
liability" and "impossibility of performance":
1470. A person may free himself from his liability for injwy caused to another by proving
that the injwy results from superior force. unless he bas undertaken to make reparation for it.
A superior force is an unforeseeable and irresistible event, including external
same characteristics.

causes with the

169_3. A debtor is released where he cannot- perform an obligation by reason of a superior
force and before he is in default. or where. although he was in default, the creditor could
not, in any case. benefit by the perfonnance of the obligation by reason of tha� superior force,
unless, in either case. the debtor bas expressly assumed the risk of superior force.
1be burden of proof of superior force is on the debtor.
1694. A debtor released by impossibility of performance may not exact performance of the
correlative obligation of the creditor; if the performance has already been rendered, restitution
·
·
is ow�.
Where the debtor has perfonned part of bis obligation, the creditor remains bounc,l to perform
bis own obligation to the extent of his enrichment.
Would either of these � relevant in a situation where a tenant has been unable to inhabit an apartment
for one month due to a catastrophic ice storm?
4. A lengthy and most useful account of the application of the English Act is provided by the
judgment of Robert Goff J. in- B.P. Exploration Co. (1.ibya) v. Hunt (No. 2), (1982) 1 All E.R. 925,
� (1982] l All E.R. 978 (C.A.). (1982] l All E.R. 986 (H.L.). Differences in the wording
of the Canadian and English Acts make it impossible to. apply Goff J. 's comments ducctly to problems
unda the Canadian legislation, but bu exploration of the principl� which underlie both At:u is useful
in answering detail� questions on their applicability.
5. For a recent example of a court unilaterally finding that a contract had been frustrat� even
though neither of the parties had argued fru_stration, and then splitting the los�es see Brunswick Data
Inc. v. New Brunswick (1998)•. 196 N.B.R. (2d) 263, 501 A.P.R. 263 (Q.B.), reversed (1999] N.BJ.
No. 95 (C.A.).
6. What difference would the different forms of Frustrated Contracts Acts make to the following
cases?
(a) Krell v.. Henry. supra, at p. 673, in which the would-be renter had made a down payment
of £25 for the rooms and promised to pay a furth�r £50. for which the owner sued.
(b) Taylor v. Caldwell, supra, section 2.
(c) Capital Quality Homes Ltd. v. Colwyn Const. Ltd.• supra. section 2.
7. Does the fact that some legislative interventions specifically empower a court to exercise
its discretion "if it considers it just to do so having regard to all the circumstances" · provide any
assistance in determining whicb•ii-the most appropriate theory to explain the doctrine of frustration?

